


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TRANSIT GUIDELINES:  
TRANSITS, PORTS AND  
ANCHORAGES WITHIN  
SOUTHEAST ASIA

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PRODUCED FOR V.SHIPS  
JANUARY 2019

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## SECTION 1: SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE

### 1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- > In 2018, a total of 79 maritime security incidents were recorded in Southeast Asia (SEA) by NYA. 61 piracy events over the year (77%) were criminal boardings and represents a continuation of a trend discernable in 2017 that saw criminal boardings account for 75% of all recorded incidents
- > Regional ports and anchorages saw the highest frequency of criminal boardings and locations with the most incidents consisted of: Batangas Port, Philippines (6); Muara Berau Anchorage; Indonesia (12) and the outer anchorages of the Singapore and Phillips Channel (12)
- > There were no recorded incidents of extended duration cargo theft (EDCT) in 2018. However, four hijackings were recorded, two in the Malacca Strait and two in the Sulu / Celebes seas
- > The Sulu / Celebes seas continue to be the centre of sustained activity by the Islamist militant Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Over 2018, 10 incidents confirmed or suspected to have been perpetrated by ASG or associated criminal groups took place in the area
- > In November 2018, ReCAAP reiterated its 21 November 2016 advisory that advised all vessels re-route from the Celebes Sea and Sulu Sea where possible

### 1.2 SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE

#### Deter:

- > Recognise risk and establish 'crew mind-set' prior to going into the SEA High Risk Area (HRA). Crew alertness and awareness should be of the highest standard. Conduct regular and rigorous training prior to entry into the region
- > All risk assessments are to be tailored to the region
- > Protect vessel, transit and cargo information where ever possible
- > Work with all commercial parties and Owners to ensure best time of arrival within charter party agreements. Transit into the area only when necessary

#### Detect:

- > Accurate and timely situational intelligence is vital to any safe and secure transit throughout the region. In SEA there is a constantly shifting area of threat – have a process to monitor information sources accordingly
- > Establish stringent watch routines and increase lookouts when in the HRA

#### Delay:

- > Any access points across the stern, decks and anchor chains should be properly defended with physical security deterrents. A vessel underway is not sufficient to deter piracy

#### Respond:

- > Have a clear decision-making process, ensure all crew understand what to do during an attack or attempted attack. Ensure all methods of communicating to crew are simple and will be easily heard and quickly understood during a noisy and stressful situation by conducting rehearsals

- 
- > When necessary enact rehearsed procedures for secure area use – on orders ensure all crew move to the secure area and ensure message of attack is passed
  - > Compliance/submission to attackers is advised if the vessel is taken and the secure area is breached

## SECTION 2: PIRACY GUIDANCE - ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR SAFETY & SECURITY

### 2.1 GENERAL COUNTER-PIRACY GUIDANCE

- > Evidence suggests attacks are intelligence led with particular products targeted in very well organised attacks. With this in mind, communications should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points or waiting positions
- > A moving ship is a more effective deterrent. Even if told to drift prior to loading, steaming is advised. Avoid, whenever possible, coastal navigation in high-risk areas

### 2.2 VESSEL PROCEDURES PRIOR TO ENTRY OF HRA:

- > All vessels must carry out a risk assessment before entering the HRA. The risk assessment is to be carried out in accordance with BMP guidance and the Shipboard Security Plan (SSP) 6.2. Risk assessments should examine likelihood and consequences of a ship robbery and piracy incident. *See Section 4.1 for further details*
- > Brief all personnel on their duties and the latest security risks in the area including the vessel hardening techniques and piracy trends. Such knowledge and preparedness can assist in successful prevention of robbery and piracy incidents
- > Ensure contingency plan and ship security plan is known and extensively rehearsed with contact details and prepared messages for emergency use. Ensure you have most up to date emergency contact details and check call if necessary
- > Compartmentalise sensitive information (for example cargo, volume of cargo etc) to ensure confidentiality and security of the vessel
- > Ensure that regular background checks on local crew are conducted to ensure their credibility
- > Primary and secondary means of communication are to be checked. Tests should be regularly conducted on the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) in compliance with ISPS code and IMO guidelines. Checks and familiarisation by crew should be carried out before entry
- > Run additional machinery such as extra generators and steering motors
- > Ensure all entrances and exits are usable and secure an internal compartment to be used as a citadel by the crew if necessary
- > Vessel hardening in a layered defence consisting of locking all exterior doors / windows, fences, razor wire and the arrangement of cargo to minimise entry points, if correctly deployed, can significantly increase the difficulty of access. Ensure this is planned and conducted prior to arrival in

the HRA. See Section 4.1 for further details

- > Control of access (including emergency exits) into and out of the accommodation, storerooms and engine room should be restricted when transiting in higher risk areas of SEA (but in a manner that allows to be easily unlocked in case of emergency) as in line with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) guidance. See Section 4.2 for further details
- > Mooring ropes and wires when not in use should be stowed on reels or kept below deck to prevent boarding access onto the vessel and to minimise the risk of theft
- > Procedures should be implemented to log security patrols of crews, the management of keys in a secure cupboard and the checking of vessel hardening measures to be carried out shortly before entry into the HRA
- > Conduct training exercises to drill crew on piracy attacks and additional emergency drills such as (but not limited to) fire drills with full hardening measures in place. Crew should rehearse to familiarise escape routes and doors and hatches which are not accessible or restricted
- > Maintenance conducted outside of the superstructure should be strictly controlled and reduced to a minimum to restrict risk to crew and to ensure hardened access points are not compromised. Tools and equipment must be stored in a secure location to prevent theft
- > Ensure that regular checks are conducted within the store rooms (particularly the bosun store, forecastle store and paint store), the steering gear room and engine room due to the threat of criminal boardings
- > Ensure that the ship security officer conducts random inspections and checks of the ship, crew and cargo

### 2.3 VESSELS CALLING AT PORTS OR ANCHORAGES WITHIN SEA:

- > Prior to entering the HRA ensure increased all-round watch routine is established and that radars are properly manned and operated to keep a lookout. Vigilance and regular changeovers of watches should be undertaken to remain alert
- > Vessels, whenever possible, maintain a distance of at least 25 miles from the coastline due to the risks of groundings and opportunistic thefts from local piracy groups. Recorded incidents in the region from 2017-2019 indicate that, with the exception of the Sulu / Celebes seas area, piracy activity is uncommon away from the coastlines of regional states
- > Vessels should avoid arriving at the port when not immediately conducting cargo operations if possible. You should liaise closely with your commercial operator to ensure that a valid Notice of Readiness is tendered and contractual obligations are met

- > Contact with the Port Control and other Port Authorities is kept to the necessary minimum
- > Where appropriate liaise with the coastal state, ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre and Information Fusion Centre (*Section 4.3 for further details*) for updates and situational awareness - **see British Admiralty Chart Q6112 and Q6113**
- > Minimise use of VHF. Use email or secure satellite telephone. Only answer known or legitimate communications (VHF, email other), bearing in mind that imposters are likely. Imposters may even appear in military fatigues
- > Reduce Automated Identification System (AIS) data to the minimum required. Do not include any cargo details
- > For email correspondence to Agents, Charterers, Chandlers etc. it is strongly recommended that address lists be controlled and that information within the email is concise, containing the minimum that is legally required in order to fulfil requirements or contractual obligations
- > Know your agents. Avoid or minimise information requirements where possible, the more interaction with other parties opens opportunities for intelligence on the vessel's location to be compromised and complicate the number of callers
- > Attacks can happen at any time, the majority of attacks take place at night, early morning and late afternoon. It is advisable to approach ports during daytime only
- > At night, and if static, consider using hoses as a deterrence to small boats encroaching the vessel. Sufficient lighting and searchlights around the vessel is a source of deterrence to robbers in port and anchorages
- > Where practicable a prolonged stay at anchorage is to be avoided due to the heightened threat of criminal boardings. In 2018, 43 of the 61 criminal boarding incidents (70%) occurred while vessels were berthed or at anchor
- > If conducting an STS operation, then where practicable offer a choice of rendezvous locations. Advise rendezvous points at the last minute and if waiting keep well off the coast (up to 200NM). Do not give away waiting positions. Avoid waiting and slow steaming where possible. Attacks have taken place in pilot boarding areas
- > At anchor, or if conducting STS operations, it is vital that a full radar and visual lookout is maintained. An early warning of any approaching craft is essential in order to give ships personnel time to respond or to retreat to a Safe Muster Point / Secure Area
- > If possible, night-time operations at anchor or for Ship-to-Ship Transfer (STS) operations are not advisable. For prolonged operations consider daytime operations only, even if this means two or

more STS to complete the operation. At night it would be recommended to depart the area and to steam away from the coastline

- > Slow steaming (less than 10 knots) is not recommended while transiting the HRA
- > Pirates have boarded via Yokohama fenders on vessels engaged in STS operations or even via anchor chains / hawse pipes. When at anchor, hawse pipe covers must be properly secured. Consider keeping the anchor washers running
- > If the vessel is a regular caller to the region, alter arrangements to make it harder for the criminals to predict where operations might take place. Do not become complacent

## **2.4 VESSELS OPERATING TRANSITS WITHIN PROXIMITY TO THE SINGAPORE STRAITS**

- > Maintain a vigilant watch and lighting at all times and minimise time spent in anchorages or drifting
- > Keep unnecessary communications to a minimum – particularly VHF communications
- > Do not respond to any unknown VHF transmissions or to any unknown email correspondence
- > Where practicable consider the use of daytime transits only since pirate activity is almost solely restricted to the night and early mornings. For instance, get started in daylight and conclude / leave in daylight if possible. Full speed transits are recommended
- > Maintain a high level of vigilance and implement full ship protection measures. Enhance the lookout and assign additional crew to anti-piracy watch during night time hours, including designated personnel for the radar watch
- > In July 2018, ReCAAP reported that a majority of piracy incidents were recorded in the western sector of the Singapore Strait and that bulk carriers were generally in the eastbound lane of the TSS in the western sector

## **2.5 VESSELS OPERATING TRANSITS THROUGH THE SIBUTU PASSAGE**

- > As the threat of abduction of crew in the Sulu / Celebes seas remains a pertinent threat, ReCAAP reiterated in November 2018 its 21 November 2016 advisory which advised that all vessels re-route from the area (Celebes Sea and the Sulu Sea) where possible. In 2017, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) also recommended vessels, if possible, take the longer route to the South China Sea by routing west of Kalimantan
- > If a transit must continue, ReCAAP advised that masters and crew exercise the following advice:
  - Enhance vigilance, maximise alertness of lookouts and increase watch keeping
  - Maintain continuous communication with shipping company and enforcement agencies for



- monitoring and immediate responses in any eventualities
- Control the access to bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces
- Sound alarm when sighting suspicious boats or suspicious persons on board in the vicinity
- Avoid confrontation with perpetrators
- Look out for advisories issued on NAVTEX
- Report all incidents to the nearest coastal state and flag state

- > ReCAAP ISC advise that, before entering the Sibutu Passage, vessels report to the Philippines Navy - Littoral Monitoring Station in Bongao, Tawi Tawi, in addition to the Philippine Coast Guard – Southwestern Mindanao Operation Centre and the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) in Malaysia. The updated contact details current as of 03 January 2019 can be found below. They include another for the Philippine Coast Guard Station - Bongao, Central Tawi-Tawi, that the Philippine Coast Guard has provided to help a timely incident response

**Philippines Navy - Littoral Monitoring Station (LMS), Bongao, Tawi-Tawi**

Tel: +63 955 714 0153      VHF: Channel 16      Email: [jointtaskgroup@gmail.com](mailto:jointtaskgroup@gmail.com)

**Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM)**

Tel: +60 898 631 81 / 016      Fax: +60 898 631 82      VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign "ESSCOM"  
Email: [bilikgerakan\\_esscom@jpm.gov.my](mailto:bilikgerakan_esscom@jpm.gov.my)

**Philippine Coast Guard - Southwestern Mindanao Operation Centre**

Tel: +63 998 585 7972 / +63 917 842 8446      VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign "NEPTUNE"  
Email: [hcgdswm@yahoo.com](mailto:hcgdswm@yahoo.com)

**Philippine Coast Guard Station - Bongao, Central Tawi-Tawi**

Tel: +63 998 585 7941 / +63 917 842 8402      VHF: Channel 16      Email: [cgd\\_tawi2@yahoo.com](mailto:cgd_tawi2@yahoo.com)

- > Further guidelines for vessels transiting in the Sulu / Celebs seas may be found in section 2.8 Regional Initiatives

## **2.6 ACTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK / ATTEMPTED BOARDING – ‘STOP – THINK – ACT’**

- > Report incident immediately to nearest coastal state, ship owner, authorities and ships within the vicinity. Remain in continuous contact if possible
- > Go through rehearsed procedures. Sound the emergency alarm, turn on all lighting and whistle / fog horn. Alerting crew and demonstrating to attackers that the ship is alert, aware and reacting to their attack
- > If not already at full speed, remain on a straight bearing and increase to maximum speed. If time permits attempt to make small alterations in course and if sea conditions allow, expose attacking skiffs to winds / wash. Avoid excessive manoeuvres that will impede speed

- > All non-essential bridge and engine room crew should muster at the citadel or pre-designated Safe Muster Point
- > Incident report **MUST** be made directly to the nominated authorities:
- > In addition, contact the nearest coastal state / law enforcement agency:

**ICC/IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia:**

Tel: +60 3 2078 5763 Fax: +60 3 2078 5769 E-mail: [imbkl@icc-ccs.org](mailto:imbkl@icc-ccs.org) / [piracy@icc-ccs.org](mailto:piracy@icc-ccs.org)

The Centre's 24 Hours Anti-Piracy HELPLINE is: +60 3 2031 0014

**Information Fusion Centre (IFC), Singapore:**

Tel: +65 9626 8965 (Out of hours) Fax: +65 6594 5734 Email: [IFC\\_DO@defence.gov.sg](mailto:IFC_DO@defence.gov.sg)

Tel: +65 6594 5728 (Office hours) Email: [information\\_fusion\\_centre@defence.gov.sg](mailto:information_fusion_centre@defence.gov.sg)

- > In addition, contact the nearest coastal state / law enforcement agency:

**AUSTRALIA - Australian Maritime Border Operations Centre Maritime Border Command**

Tel: +61 2 6275 6000 Fax: +61 2 6275 6275 Email: [mbcengagement@abf.gov.au](mailto:mbcengagement@abf.gov.au)

**BANGLADESH - Bangladesh Department of Shipping:**

Tel: +88 02 955 4206 Fax: +88 02 958 7301 Email: [cns@dos.gov.bd](mailto:cns@dos.gov.bd)

**BRUNEI - Brunei Police Marine:**

Tel: +673 883 64 95 Fax: +673 277 40 00 Email: [kasnol.kincho@police.gov.bn](mailto:kasnol.kincho@police.gov.bn)

**CAMBODIA - Merchant Marine Department**

Tel: +85 5 2386 4110 Fax: +85 5 2386 4110 Email: [mmd@mpwt.gov.kh](mailto:mmd@mpwt.gov.kh)

**CHINA - China Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination (Beijing)**

Tel: +86-10-6529-2218 / +86-10-6529-2219 / +86-10-6529-2221 Fax: +86-10-6529-2245

Email: [cnmrcc@mot.gov.cn](mailto:cnmrcc@mot.gov.cn)

**CHINA - Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (Hong Kong)**

Tel: +85-2-2233-7999 Fax: +85-2-2541-7714 Email: [hkmrcc@mardep.gov.hk](mailto:hkmrcc@mardep.gov.hk)

**INDIA - MRCC (Mumbai) and Coast Guard Region (West)**

Tel: +91 22 2438 8065 / +91 22 2431 6558 Fax: +91 22 2431 6558 / +91 22 2433 3727

E-mail: [mrcc-west@indiancoastguard.nic.in](mailto:mrcc-west@indiancoastguard.nic.in) / [indsar@vsnl.net](mailto:indsar@vsnl.net)

**INDONESIA - Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board**

Tel: +62 21 500 500 E-mail: [crisiscenter@barkorkanla.go.id](mailto:crisiscenter@barkorkanla.go.id)

**MALAYSIA - Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Authority (MMEA)**

Northern region Tel: +604 966 9800 Fax: +604 966 0542

Southern region Tel: +607 219 9400 Fax: +607 219 9451  
 Eastern region Tel: +609 571 7300 Fax: +609 573 3569  
 Sabah region Tel: +608 827 0165 Fax: +608 827 0105  
 Tel: +608 852 4601  
 Sarawak region Tel: +608 243 2490 Fax: +608 243 2471  
 Tel: +608 243 2540

**MYANMAR – MRCC Ayeyarwaddy (Myanmar Navy)**

Tel: +95 313 1651 Fax: +95 1202 417

Email: [mrcc.yangon@mptmail.com.mm](mailto:mrcc.yangon@mptmail.com.mm) / [mrcc.myanmar2012@gmail.com](mailto:mrcc.myanmar2012@gmail.com)

**PHILIPPINES - Philippine Coast Guard**

Tel: +63 2 527 8481 to 89 (ext: 6136 / 37) / +63 917 724 3682 / +63 929 825 3207

Fax: +63 2 527 3877 E-mail: [cgac@coastguard.gov.ph](mailto:cgac@coastguard.gov.ph)

**PHILIPPINES - Southwestern Mindanao Operation Centre**

Tel: +63 998 585 7972 / +63 917 842 8446 VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign “NEPTUNE”

Email: [hcgdswwm@yahoo.com](mailto:hcgdswwm@yahoo.com)

**SINGAPORE - Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore**

Tel: +65-6226-5539 Fax: +65-6227-9917

**SINGAPORE - Port Operations Control Centre**

Tel: +65 6325 2493 Fax: +65 6224 5776 Email: [pocc@mpa.gov.sg](mailto:pocc@mpa.gov.sg)

**THAILAND - Royal Thai Navy Maritime Information Sharing Centre (MISC)**

Tel: +66 2475 4532 Fax: +66 2475 4577 E-mail: [miscdutyofficer@misc.go.th](mailto:miscdutyofficer@misc.go.th) /

[sornchon2558@gmail.com](mailto:sornchon2558@gmail.com)

**VIETNAM - Vietnam Coast Guard**

Tel: +84 4 3355 4378 Fax: +84 4 3355 4363 E-mail: [vietnamcoastguard@gmail.com](mailto:vietnamcoastguard@gmail.com)

- > Ensure the vessel AIS is switched ON
- > If the boats continue to within 600m, initiate the ship pre-prepared emergency procedures. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), alerting your CSO and flag state. Broadcast a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch.16 (156.8 MHz) and a distress message via Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C (if applicable)

## 2.7 ACTION IN THE EVENT OF BOARDING

- > Ensure that engine is stopped; all crew should proceed to the citadel or pre-designated Safe Muster Point

- > Establish communication with the relevant coast guard and confirm all crewmembers are accounted for in the citadel or Safe Muster Point. Lock all internal doors on route
- > Stay in the citadel or Safe Muster Point until conditions force you to leave or are advised by the military
- > If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates have full control of the vessel
- > **Compliance / submission to attackers is essential once a vessel is taken.** Violence is uncommon but does occur in hijacking and boardings. Captured crewmembers should keep their hands visible and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence

## 2.8 REGIONAL INITIATIVES

- > The Indonesia Marine Police (POLAIR) has designated ten established and safe anchorages to be “monitored and patrolled regularly”. The anchorages are:
  - (1) Belawan: 03:55.00N - 098:45.30E
  - (2) Dumai: 01:42.00N - 101:28.00E
  - (3) Nipah: 01:07.30N - 103:37.00E
  - (4) Tanjung Berakit / Bintan: 01:23.30N - 104:42.30E
  - (5) Tanjung Priok: 06:00.30S - 106:54.00E
  - (6) Gresik: 07:09.00S - 112:40.00E
  - (7) Taboneo: 03:41.30S - 114:28.00E
  - (8) Adang bay: 01:40.00S - 116:40.00E
  - (9) Muara Berau: 00:17.00S - 117:36.00E
  - (10) Balikpapan: 01:22.00S - 116:53.00E
- > The POLAIR advises all ships intending to anchor to do so within these anchorages to ensure patrols can be concentrated in select areas to prevent and deter piracy. They further advise that ships maintain a strict anti-piracy watch and measures, as well as report all attacks and suspicious sightings to local authorities and the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
- > On 19 June 2017 the Philippines Department of National Defence announced that Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines launched a trilateral maritime patrol agreement to deter and combat piracy in Sulu / Celebes seas. In October 2017, air patrols were also launched in the area. Those initiatives have improved communication and information-sharing between the two initiatives. However, the size of the region and limited resources in terms of patrols vessels and manpower indicates that their effects are likely to remain limited
- > Following the announcement of trilateral patrols on 19 June the Philippine Coast Guard issued a Notice to Mariners (NTM) on 02 August 2017 - NTM Nr 148-2017 indicating transit corridors to serve as safety areas that will be patrolled by the three countries. On 14 August 2017 the Marine

Department of Malaysia also issued an NTM (NTM 14 of 2017 for Sabah region) listing the coordinates of the transit corridor for commercial shipping covering the maritime areas of concern. The vessel reporting system was also included in the NTM

> Philippine Coast Guard NTM Nr 148-2017, dated 02 August 2017, designated the limit of the safety areas as bounded by the following coordinates:

- Point ID 1: 08:50:40N - 123:00:00E
- Point ID 2: 05:59:36N - 119:48:59E
- Point ID 5: 05:53:36N - 119:47:06E
- Point ID 6: 05:07:45N - 119:35:02E
- Point ID 7: 04:23:00N - 119:35:00E
- Point ID 11: 04:28:08N - 119:42:00E
- Point ID 12: 05:04:35N - 119:42:00E
- Point ID 13: 05:56:30N - 119:56:00E
- Point ID 3: 06:00:00N - 118:50:00E
- Point ID 4: 05:52:36N - 118:57:34E
- Point ID 8: 04:23:00N - 119:46:54E
- Point ID 9: 06:13:33N - 122:27:00E
- Point ID 10: 06:17:14N - 122:20:00E
- Point ID 14: 07:32:43N - 121:43:00E
- Point ID 15: 06:55:00N - 121:43:00E
- Point ID 16: 06:40:00N - 122:20:00E
- Point ID 17: 06:41:28N - 122:27:00E
- Point ID 18: 06:56:28N - 121:50:00E
- Point ID 19: 07:38:58N - 121:50:00E
- Point ID 20: 08:41:16N - 123:00:00E

> Marine Department of Malaysia Sabah Region NTM 14 of 2017, dated 14 August 2017, is addressed to vessels in the area of common concern with the following coordinates:

- Point A: 07:11:00N - 118:32:00E
- Point B: 05:48:00N - 120:30:00E
- Point C: 04:48:00N - 120:30:00E
- Point D: 03:11:33N - 119:23:52E
- Point E: 03:56:00N - 118:22:30E
- Point F: 05:21:00N - 119:21:30E
- Point G: 06:21:00N - 117:57:00E




Image 1: Marine Department of Malaysia Transit Corridor for Commercial Shipping

Source: Marine Department of Malaysia Sabah Region

- > NTM 14 of 2017 states that all vessels are required to render report to the National Coast Watch Center, LMS Bongao, Maritime Command Center Philippines, Coast Guard Action Centre, Naval Operation Center, Maritime Command Center Malaysia and Maritime Command Center Indonesia at least 24 hours before arrival at the designated maritime areas of common concern, with complete vessel routing information

Contact Details for agencies listed above:

**National Coast Watch Center (NCWC):**

Tel: +63 (2) 2413104

Email: [ncwatchcenter@gmail.com](mailto:ncwatchcenter@gmail.com)

**Navy Operation Center (NOC), Philippine Navy:**

Tel: +63 (917) 8512708

Tel: +63 (2) 5244981

Email: [noc@nav.ph](mailto:noc@nav.ph) / [hpn.noc@navy.mil.ph](mailto:hpn.noc@navy.mil.ph)

**Coast Guard Action Center (CGAC), Philippine Coast Guard**

Tel: +63 (917) 7243682

Tel: +63 (2) 5273877

Email: [cgac@coastguard.gov.ph](mailto:cgac@coastguard.gov.ph)

**Naval Forces Western Mindanao Operation Center**

Tel: +63 (917) 6860681

Email: [nfwm.nfoc@navy.mil.ph](mailto:nfwm.nfoc@navy.mil.ph) / [nfoc@wm@gmail.com](mailto:nfoc@wm@gmail.com)

**Maritime Research Information Center (MRIC)**

Tel: +63 (917) 7085248    Tel: +63 (2) 8431833    Email: [mric@nav.ph](mailto:mric@nav.ph)

**Maritime Command Center (MCC), Tawau Malaysia**

Tel: +6089 775600    Tel: +6089 779777    Tel: +6089 982623 (1700 - 0800)

Email: [mcctawau2@gmail.com](mailto:mcctawau2@gmail.com)

**Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM)**

Tel: +60 898 631 81 / 016    Fax: +60 898 631 82    VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign "ESSCOM"

Email: [bilikgerakan\\_esscom@jpm.gov.my](mailto:bilikgerakan_esscom@jpm.gov.my)

**Marine Department Malaysia, Sabah Region**

Tel: +6088 401111    Email: [aisjlsbh@marine.gov.my](mailto:aisjlsbh@marine.gov.my)

**Maritime Command Center (MCC), Tarakan Indonesia**

Tel: +625513806288    Tel: +625513806289

Email: [mcctarakan2@gmail.com](mailto:mcctarakan2@gmail.com) / [mcc\\_tarakan@tnial.mid.id](mailto:mcc_tarakan@tnial.mid.id)

- > NTM 14 of 2017 instructs that the following procedure shall be completed upon entering the maritime areas of common concern upon establishment of radio contact with the monitoring station:

"SECURITY, SECURITY...THIS IS (NAME OF VESSEL)

I AM ENTERING (NAME OF SEA LANE, EX: SIBUTU PASSAGE, ALICE CHANNEL, ETC.)

WITH A SPEED OF \_\_\_ AND COURSE \_\_\_.

PRESENT POSITION: (LATITUDE / LONGITUDE) OR AT VICINITY (NEAREST POINT OF REFERENCE)

STATUS: (I.E. UNDERWAY, ALL IS WELL, UNDER ATTACK OR IN DISTRESS)"

**\*If under attack, request immediate assistance / rescue.**

- > The NTM states that all vessels in the area of common concern are required to pass through the designated transit corridors / sea lanes, with the following coordinates:

- > Point ID 1: 06:09:15.8N - 119:59:46.0E
- > Point ID 2: 05:59:36.0N - 119:48:59.0E
- > Point ID 3: 05:59:36.0N - 118:27:08.3E
- > Point ID 4: 05:21:00.0N - 119:21:30.0E



- > Point ID 5: 04:44:59.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - > Point ID 6: 04:03:30.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - > Point ID 9: 03:56:30.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - > Point ID 16: 03:59:14.0N - 119:00:30.0E
  - > Point ID 17: 04:39:43.0N - 119:00:30.0E
  - > Point ID 7: 04:03:00.0N - 118:27:21.5E
  - > Point ID 8: 03:56:00.0N - 118:22:30.0E
  - > Point ID 10: 03:44:12.5N - 118:38:46.8E
  - > Point ID 11: 03:39:48.6N - 118:44:51.1E
  - > Point ID 12: 04:52:45.7N - 120:30:00.0E
  - > Point ID 13: 05:01:16.7N - 120:30:00.0E
  - > Point ID 14: 04:28:08.0N - 119:42:00.0E
  - > Point ID 15: 04:23:16.0N - 119:35:00.0E
  - > Point ID 23: 05:04:35.0N - 119:35:02.0E
  - > Point ID 24: 05:04:35.0N - 119:42:00.0E
  - > Point ID 18: 05:19:00.0N - 119:28:37.0E
  - > Point ID 19: 05:25:04.0N - 119:28:37.0E
  - > Point ID 20: 05:52:36.0N - 118:49:51.9E
  - > Point ID 21: 05:52:36.0N - 119:47:06.0E
  - > Point ID 22: 05:07:45.0N - 119:35:02.0E
  - > Point ID 25: 05:56:30.0N - 119:56:00.0E
  - > Point ID 26: 06:05:08.0N - 120:05:38.5E
- 
- > All vessels are required to render POSREP and SITREP as they enter the maritime areas of common concern, and every hour or as necessary
  - > An updated version of the NTM Nr 148-2017 and NTM 14 of 2017 areas were not released in 2018



## SECTION 3: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (JANUARY 2019)

### 3.1 SEA HIGH RISK AREA

- > The Joint War Committee (JWC) removed the Port of Jakarta as a listed area on 14 June 2018
- > The Joint Cargo Committee rates Indonesia as elevated risk similarly to the Philippines, whereas the Malay Peninsula (Singapore Strait in its entirety and South China Sea bound at 4' north, 1' north to the south and 106' east to the east) was downgraded to low risk
- > The JWC zones, however, do not reflect the true scale of the SEA HRA, below is a zone representative of all piracy in SEA during 2015 which is still current as of 07 January 2019



Image 2: Representative zone of all piracy in the SEA HRA (2015)

Source: NYA

## 3.2 PIRATE AREAS OF OPERATION

- > **Concentration area:** The majority of SEA piracy incidents are concentrated at regional ports and anchorages. Criminal boardings, in particular, are a concern in these areas and during 2018, 43 of the 61 (70%) incidents of this type occurred while vessels were berthed or at anchor. The outer anchorages of the Singapore Strait and Philips Channel have consistently seen a comparatively higher frequency of criminal boardings. 'Significant' piracy incidents (boarding, hijacking, PAG sighting and attack) remain most likely in the Sulu / Celebes seas surrounding the Sulu Archipelago, Philippines, where the ASG and associated criminal groups operate. As indicated by two hijackings that took place in 2018 within the Malacca Strait, criminal groups possess the capability to target vessels across regional coastlines
- > **Northern:** The Sulu / Celebes seas continues to be the focus of significant piracy incidents due to the presence of ASG and linked criminal groups. In 2018, a total of 10 piracy events in the area were confirmed or suspect to have been perpetrated by ASG or their associates. Of these incidents, eight were significant and included: three attacks, two hijackings, two boardings and one PAG sighting. Area piracy targets since 2015 have ranged from fishing vessels, sailing vessels, tugs, fishing vessels to larger commercial vessels such as bulk carriers, general cargo vessels, container vessels and chemical / product tankers. Incidents mainly occur southwest and west of Doc Can Island and within the Sibutu passage but, as illustrated by a 16 February 2018 attack 14NM southeast of Zamboanga, Philippines, groups retain the capability to target vessels throughout the Sulu Archipelago
- > **Eastern:** The east of the SEA HRA has not seen a recorded significant incident since the 25 February 2015 cargo theft-motivated hijacking of the REHOBOT tanker 10NM north east of Pulau Lembeh, Indonesia. From 2016 - 2019, the overwhelming majority of the 38 incidents have consisted of criminal boardings (36) with the remained being suspicious approaches (2). Part of trend noted across SEA, these criminal boardings predominantly occurred within eastern ports and anchorages. This pattern was again evident in 2018 and the 12 criminal boardings recorded in the Muara Berau Anchorage, Indonesia, represented a significant increase on the 5 incidents of the same type in 2017. Outside of this anchorage, infrequent incidents were also recorded along the coast of East Kalimantan, Indonesia
- > **Western:** Two hijackings in the Malacca Strait on 18 April and 18 August were the first incidents of this type to be recorded within the area since December 2015. Despite the severity of the events, they involved fishing vessels located within 3NM of the Malaysian coast and commercial vessels transiting through the Malacca shipping lanes are unlikely to be at risk. A more distinct threat to vessels remains in the outer anchorages of the Singapore Strait and Philips Channel where 12 criminal boardings and two suspicious approaches were recorded. The primary target in criminal boarding incidents was consistent with previous years and perpetrators aimed to steal vessel property and crewmember belongings
- > **Southern:** While a significant incident in the south of the SEA HRA has not been recorded since May 2016, port and anchorage areas continued in 2018 to see piracy activity consisting of criminal boardings (9) and a single suspicious approach. There were no recorded incidents that took place in

excess of 10NM from the coastlines. Three criminal boardings respectively took place in the Port of Jakarta and Merak Anchorage and indicates that, although the former was removed as a JWC listed area on 14 June 2018, the vessels and the port and its vicinity remain a target for criminal groups. Similar to criminal boarding incidents recorded throughout the region, the primary target for perpetrators was vessel property and crewmember belongings

- > **Range:** Incidents in SEA continue to occur mainly in anchorages, ports and traffic separation schemes where ships are transiting close to the coastline or at anchor. Most hijackings and extended duration cargo thefts occur within 50NM of the baseline coast or islands, however a minority have occurred in excess of 100NM
- > **Time:** The overwhelming majority of incidents were recorded at night. Vessels are most at risk of piracy during the late evening and early morning from 1930-0645

### 3.3 OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS

- > SEA piracy is divided between two distinct criminal groups: highly organised hijackers conducting sophisticated intelligence-led operations, being extremely selective in the targets they attack; and opportunistic port and anchorage criminal boardings
- > Violence against resisting crew is uncommon. Restraining crewmembers with rope or locking them in rooms is more common. However, ASG are likely to use violence against crewmembers if they attempt to resist abduction, especially during incidents in the Sulu and Celebes seas

### 3.4 SEA CATEGORIES OF ATTACK

- > The level of pirate activity within SEA may broadly be split into the following categories:
  - o **Criminal Boardings:** Often carried out in the evening or early morning when in port or anchorage. Since 2012, criminal boardings have been recorded in eight of the eleven EEZ's of the coastal South and Southeast Asian nations. Although the least severe and violent of all piracy incidents, certain incidents have involved the use of weaponry, including machetes, long knives and handguns. The intention of such robberies is often to gain valuables from the crew (smart phones, laptops etc.) and also vessels' stores without discovery. Thefts occur most commonly within the store rooms, forecastle, engine room and steering gear room
  - o In criminal boardings, pirates approach the vessel in a fast outboard prahu, fiberglass or other small craft from astern to avoid forward looking radar and lookouts. Pirates boarding methods to reach the deck include grappling hooks with ropes attached, poles with hooks, climbing on the yokohama fenders or via mooring lines. Pirates once boarded can complete criminal boardings within six minutes and often remain undetected until discovered within the superstructure or sighted leaving the vessel with stolen property. Pirates are willing to threaten, hold a crewmember at knifepoint or tie up a crewman if encountered singularly. However, if the alarm is raised by a crewmember, pirates will

vacate the vessel at speed and are willing to jump overboard regardless of freeboard

- o **Extended Duration Cargo Theft (EDCT):** Tanker hijackings with the motive of large-scale cargo theft has reemerged as a threat to product tankers throughout SEA since April 2014. EDCT are almost solely related to product and chemical tankers (less than 5000GT). More than half of the oil cargo thefts occur in South China seas. Vessels are hijacked for between three to seven days and cargo is discharged to a smaller vessel. At least three organised groups or syndicates operating in the South China seas and Malacca Strait are involved in the theft. Despite the absence of EDCT incidents in 2018, during 2017, three hijacking incidents were reported where vessels were targeted for their cargo; two vessels for diesel oil and one for palm oil
- o **Kidnapping:** The majority of kidnapped crewmembers taken since 2014 have been abducted by ASG in the Sulu and Celebes seas. According to ReCAAP, as of January 2019, there were ten crewmembers being held in captivity by ASG militants

| RISK OF EDCT IN SEA ASIA |                                         | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----|--------|------|
| Gross tonnage            | < 2000                                  |     |        | ✓    |
|                          | 2000 – 5000                             |     | ✓      |      |
|                          | > 5000                                  | ✓   |        |      |
| Cargo type               | MGO, MFO, MDO, Diesel, ADF              |     |        | ✓    |
|                          | Gasoline, lube oil, palm oil and others |     | ✓      |      |
|                          | Other                                   | ✓   |        |      |
| Location                 | South China Sea                         |     |        | ✓    |
|                          | Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) |     | ✓      |      |
|                          | Other                                   |     | ✓      |      |

### 3.5 ANALYSIS ON EDCT

There were no EDCT incidents recorded in 2018, however, according to ReCAAP, from 2011-2017 a total of 40 cargo theft incidents were reported in Asia, with more than half being in the South China seas. Since April 2014, more than 3.5 million metric tonnes (MT) of refined petroleum products has been stolen from product tankers. From 2012-2013 the record of successful cargo theft hijackings was mixed, with less than half being successful.

- > **Scale of Fuel Theft:** The estimated value of fuel smuggling in SEA was estimated in January 2018 to be between USD2-3 billion per year. Fuel is a particular concern in the Singapore Strait, the coast of Vietnam and the Indonesian Archipelago. The illegal fuel trade is also becoming increasingly sophisticated as shipping vessel are transformed to accommodate the transport of fuel.
- > **Bunker Theft:** The large-scale theft of bunkered oil is highly organised and intelligence driven, with selected vessels targeted with collaboration with unknown industry or government officials providing

information on vessels' location and contents. After such hijackings, the pirates report back to their senior commanders and arrange the sale of cargo and rendezvous point for STS transfer

### 3.6 ANALYSIS ON EDCT HIJACKINGS

Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) generally operate in large numbers, with 6-10 or more pirates per attack, to overwhelm and immediately suppress any crew on board. Vessels are approached at high speed and boarded with minimal force so as not to alert the crew. EDCT-motivated attacks throughout 2015-2016 showed highly developed awareness of the crew usage of vessel communication and tracking systems as well as the STS transfer processes. It is known that pirate gangs and syndicates have accessibility to type of cargo carried by victim vessels, route undertaken and type of equipment on board to facilitate siphoning.

Vessels hijacked with the intention of EDCT are steered away from high density shipping lanes and in a minority of cases vessels are repainted and names altered to avoid detection. In the hijackings of the ORAPIN 4, DANAI 4 and ZAFIRAH, the identity of the vessel was physically painted over and in the case of the ZAFIRAH its IMO number was also changed. Typically, crew are tied up or locked away in staterooms or a cabin and may suffer physical violence and intimidation. A minority of pirate cells will cast crew adrift in lifeboats or be thrown overboard to further lower the risk of detection. There is little evidence to suggest that the 'ghost ship' trend of the 1979 to 2005 type, where vessels were hijacked for sale or insurance fraud, is a primary motivation for current hijacks.

Vessels are held for several days as the vessel transits to a prearranged location or tanker / barge comes alongside and begins the siphoning operations. In the majority of EDCT-motivated incidents, ReCAAP believes that there is already a buyer of cargo. If the pirates leave the vessel without a siphon it is assessed by regional focal points that the pirates had incorrect cargo information or boarded the wrong vessel. Before leaving a vessel, the pirates will loot the vessel of crew properties, vessel properties (including stores and valuable spares) and destroy communication and navigation equipment (if not already destroyed or damaged in the initial hijack).

- > **Outlook:** EDCT will continue to pose a threat to vessels transiting through SEA. A lack of quantitative increases in maritime security force assets; a geographical vast area to police, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) historical weakness over maritime coordination will continue to hamper coordinated efforts. Efforts by ReCAAP, IFC and other regional bodies have made significant progress in recent years against pirate syndicates, however, there has been no progress in countering criminal boardings which has consistently plagued the region since 1981



## SECTION 4: SUPPORTING INFORMATION

### 4.1 VESSEL VOYAGE RISK ASSESSMENT AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

ALL VESSELS MUST CARRY OUT A RISK ASSESSMENT BEFORE ENTERING THE HRA. THE RISK ASSESSMENT IS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH BMP GUIDANCE AND THE SHIPBOARD SECURITY PLAN (SSP) 6.2.

Form S23 in the Ship Security Plan is to be used for this purpose. It is to be forwarded to the office, and agreed with CSO prior leaving last port before transit of the High Risk Area and shall include as a minimum:

| MINIMUM INFORMATION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; High Risk Areas to be transited and intended route</li> <li>&gt; Identify whether the vessel is high risk; all vessels with less than 8 metres freeboard are deemed high risk</li> <li>&gt; Identify whether a convoy is recommended; identifying the convoy and advise Owners accordingly</li> <li>&gt; Full details of Ship Protection Measures and any additional equipment required</li> <li>&gt; If armed guards onboard</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Vessel Type</li> <li>&gt; LoA / breadth</li> <li>&gt; Freeboard</li> <li>&gt; Loaded or in ballast</li> <li>&gt; Cargo</li> <li>&gt; Full speed</li> <li>&gt; M/E attain &gt; 90% MCR?</li> <li>&gt; Nos. of crew</li> <li>&gt; Nos. of supernumerary</li> <li>&gt; Nos. of cadets</li> <li>&gt; Nos. of females</li> <li>&gt; Reduce to non-essential staff?</li> <li>&gt; M/E confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; A/E confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; Boiler confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; Steering gear confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; Test of main fire pumps and emergency fire pump confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; Relevant drills performed on board?</li> <li>&gt; Master and officers of the watch have been familiarized with the impact of zigzag maneuvers onboard and in particular the impact that these manoeuvres can have upon reducing the speed of the vessel?</li> <li>&gt; Engine room to be manned during the transit?</li> <li>&gt; SSAS test confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; North / South bound</li> <li>&gt; East / West bound</li> <li>&gt; Latest update of instructions on board?</li> <li>&gt; Latest edition of Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy (BMP) on board?</li> <li>&gt; SAT-C set to the 'Indian Ocean Region'</li> <li>&gt; Latest intelligence regarding piracy attacks and activity on board?</li> <li>&gt; Both citadel and safe muster point confirmed OK (if applies)?</li> <li>&gt; Primary and secondary means of citadel communication (satellite phone and VHF) tested and confirmed OK?</li> <li>&gt; All anti-piracy equipment on board (SPM)?</li> </ul> |

All irregularities to above points shall be reported immediately to the company. If any irregularities are observed the vessel must not proceed into the special precautionary area without agreement of the company.

The overall aim of the risk assessment is to minimise the risk of attack and successful hijack. This is achieved through a combination of passage planning, Ship Protection Measures, a prepared crew and good communications between ship and shore.

Risk assessments are to be copied to piracy@vships.com

## 4.2 SHIP PROTECTION MEASURES (GUIDELINES)

Different vessels have different requirements and the overall aim is to achieve the best solution for the individual vessel and transit. This will be identified pre-transit during the risk assessment phase.

Before entering the HRA, all anti-piracy measures and equipment shall be implemented and rigged. These anti-piracy measures must be applied throughout the transit of the HRA. The vessel shall not depart the last port of call or anchorage prior to passage of the HRA without agreement on Ship Protection Measures to be implemented.

| EQUIPMENT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | DETAIL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Additional hoses</b><br>16 x hoses 30m<br>4 x foam applicators with eductors<br>16 x 25 liter foam liquid<br>8 x fire main Y-pieces                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <p>Fire hoses and applicators shall be rigged, fixed and ready for immediate use throughout the High Risk Area.</p> <p>The foam is a supplement to the already rigged water curtain as per BMP5 section 5. On vessels with separate foam line and foam pump, this can be used instead of the main fire line and main fire pumps. It is important that the fire hoses cover midship sections of the vessel as well as vessel's quarters and stern.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| <b>Razor wire and protective gloves</b><br>Sufficient concertina razor wire for two layers covering the full perimeter of the vessel (See diagram).<br>Sufficient razor wire for rigging in strategic points around the accommodation<br>Clips/wire ties for rigging above<br>12 x heavy duty gloves<br>2 x heavy duty wire cutters<br>Silk wire or steel wire with a diameter of 3-4mm | <p>It is important that the razor wire is rigged in such a way that it covers the opening between the fish plate and the railing thus preventing any attackers from passing below the razor wire.</p> <p>One layer of razor wire shall be rigged in a highly visible position outside the accommodation i.e. along the railing so it can be seen from small skiffs or boats. This layer of razor wire will have a deterrent effect on pirates (razor wire should not obstruct access to life rafts or lifeboat(s).</p> <p>The silk wire or steel wire shall run through the centre of the coils of razor wire rigged in two layers covering the entire perimeter of the vessel from fore to aft. The silk</p> |

|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                             | wire or steel wire must run behind some of the railings vertical posts at regular intervals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <b>Night vision binoculars</b><br>2 x pairs |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>Doors, hatches and portholes</b>         | <p>All doors and hatches, not just those facing the weather deck, but including interior ones providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces must be properly secured to prevent them from being opened.</p> <p>Hatches can be reinforced with measures such as padlock/angle bar protection box, however poor-quality padlocks are regularly breached. As a result, a regular review on padlock quality for suitable size, security grades (EN12320) and water-proofing is necessary.</p> <p>In addition to the padlocking of the skyline hatch from the outside, sling wire-lashing from the inside of the ship's stores onto the hatch can be made with the end secured to a turn-buckle to prevent slack. Without a turn-buckle, the hatch can still be breached and the sling wire-lashing may slack through vibration or other factors.</p> <p>Accommodation portholes and windows must be fitted with hardening arrangements such as dead lights or interior grilles. To facilitate evacuation in times of safety hazards, mechanisms such as variable bolts and butterfly latches can be used to secure the grilles.</p> <p><b>Ensure that a designated and limited number of access points must be used for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors and hatches must be controlled by the Officer of the Watch.</b></p> |

#### USE OF WATER SPRAY AND FOAM MONITORS

- > Fire hoses and foam monitors should be fixed taking into account likely access routes. Water coverage can be improved by using jet mode and using baffle plates fixed at short distance of the nozzle
- > Water spray rails can also be used in conjunction to spray nozzles to create a water curtain to cover larger areas
- > Foam or dye mix can also be used:
  - o Ox blood or urine additives used to produce foam are particularly unpleasant for anyone who is covered by the foam – foul smell, sticky, irritant to eyes and respiratory systems
  - o The use of dye markers could assist in subsequent prosecutions. Where an attack has been unsuccessful, but a subsequent boarding of a suspected pirate skiff takes place,



the naval forces could possibly link the pirates to the attack if they detect the presence of non-soluble dye markers

- o A small skiff will become unmanageable more quickly if it is filled or swamped with foam rather than just water
- o A pirate covered in foam will find it significantly more difficult to climb a ladder and board a vessel

## MANOEUVERING PRACTICE

BMP5 section 5 on “Manoeuvring” and the Global Counter Piracy Guidance recommend the Master and officers of the watch shall be fully familiar with the impact of zigzag manoeuvres on board and in particular the impact that these manoeuvres can have upon reducing the speed of the vessel. If the vessel comes under attack, evasive manoeuvres such as turning the vessel into the wind, provided they do not significantly slow the vessel, should be considered. Forcing the skiffs into the wind and swell has proven effective in hampering attacks. The geographical conditions of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), traffic separation systems and other choke points in SEA means that manoeuvring may not be possible.

## LRIT POLICY

The LRIT shall remain in operation at all times.

## SAT-C

The SAT-C must be on ‘Indian Ocean Region’ to ensure the vessel receives urgent piracy alerts and warnings.

## NAVIGATION LIGHTS

At night, navigation lights shall be exhibited in accordance with the COLREGS.

## TRAINING

A training module entitled ‘Anti-Piracy Awareness’ has recently been sent to all vessels. All crewmembers must view this as part of preparation for entering the HRA. Drills must be held prior to entering the HRA.

## GAS CYLINDERS

Pressurized cylinders, including any spare medical oxygen cylinders from the hospital, shall be placed in the purpose built locker prior to transit.

## GUIDELINES FOR FITTING RAZOR WIRE


This guideline is intended to assist the vessel's crew in fitting razor wire efficiently, safely and durably. When fitting the razor wire it is important for crewmembers to wear helmet, safety goggles, safety shoes, and heavy duty gloves (e.g. welding gloves) and to obtain wire in short sections so it is easier and safer to


move. The use of wire hooks is recommended when placing wire on the vessel.

It is recommended to a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. At least a third ring should be attached to the vessel's railings a steel cable should be rigged through its core. Additionally, razor wire should be secured wire a wire stop to prevent it from being dislodged. Razor wire should also be properly maintained so it does not become rusty and as a result weaker.

It is recommended to fit two layers (see below) with the first layer being Concertina razor wire. Thereby the vessel is still secured even if the first coil is ripped down. It has been reported that pirates in a few incidents have succeeded in ripping down the razor wire by hooks. Therefore, care must be taken when attaching.

The wire must be detached during shipboard operations. Chocks and fairleads should be clear and, if still rigged, razor wire should not interfere with port operations (mooring, gangways, loading and discharging). After dismantling the wire must be washed thoroughly in fresh water and stowed sheltered on hangers or similar.







## GUIDELINES FOR DOORS

Below are examples of how doors can be strengthened without the need for further keys or the usage of tools. Pipes or wooden struts placed sitting across the rear (interior of the superstructure side) of any external doors can sufficiently deter entrance of pirates or criminal boardings into the core internal sections of a vessel.

Padlocks and locked doors should be used in accordance to MCA and USCG guidance but further strengthening measures should be considered when transiting in high risk areas. NYA data for 2014 shows that when criminals and pirates forced access into secured areas of the ship, in 50% of incidents blunt force was sufficient enough to break locks. A further 37% of incidents showed padlocks being breached using tools and cutting equipment gaining access to numerous areas of the vessel including storerooms.







Extra strengthening on at risk doors mainly used in the construction of a secure room or citadel



As above – a further deterrent to access should the lock be breached (metal is preferred to wood)



Watertight door effectively secured

### 4.3 INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is a 24/7 multi-national maritime security information centre. It aims to achieve early warning of maritime security threats by building a common maritime situation picture through the efforts of the various stakeholders including the shipping community. The IFC is manned by an integrated team of International Liaison Officers and Republic Singaporean Navy personnel and it has extensive linkages with more than 65 agencies in 35 countries. Through its operational linkages, the IFC is able to reach out to different navies and enforcement agencies. The IFC also works with the shipping community to enhance maritime security through regular activities such as the Shared Awareness Meeting (SAM) and company visits.

| IFC INITIAL REPORT              |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Vessels name:                   |  |
| International radio call sign:  |  |
| Flag:                           |  |
| Number of crew / nationalities: |  |
| Nationality of ship master:     |  |
| IMO number:                     |  |
| Draft                           |  |
| MMSI:                           |  |
| Inmarsat-M telephone number:    |  |
| Mobile phone number:            |  |
| Inmarsat-C Telex:               |  |
| Inmarsat-M / GSM fax number:    |  |
| Email address:                  |  |

|                                                    |  |
|----------------------------------------------------|--|
| Current position / course:                         |  |
| Planned passage speed:                             |  |
| Waypoints of planned track:                        |  |
| Next port of call and ETA:                         |  |
| Last port of call:                                 |  |
| Name and address of ship owner:                    |  |
| Agent name and email address at next port of call: |  |



## ANNEX A: THREAT TERMINOLOGY

The report's findings are predictive and estimative. To communicate these findings clearly and in order to accurately compare threat levels, the report uses a variation of terminology used by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

| THREAT LEVEL       | DESCRIPTION                                            |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Critical</b>    | The likelihood of an incident is <b>certain</b>        |
| <b>Severe</b>      | The likelihood of an incident is <b>almost certain</b> |
| <b>Substantial</b> | The likelihood of an incident is <b>probable</b>       |
| <b>Moderate</b>    | The likelihood of an incident is <b>about even</b>     |
| <b>Low</b>         | The likelihood of an incident is <b>improbable</b>     |

**Piracy:** NYA uses a modified version of the definition of piracy adopted by BMP5. For the purposes of this report, the term 'piracy' includes all violent and non-violent acts against vessels, her crew and cargo occurring either in internal waterways, territorial waters or deep offshore. Based on this definition, NYA classifies piracy incidents into six categories:

- > **Hijacking:** Crew lost control of the vessel and / or pirates kidnapped at least one crewmember and / or passenger(s)
- > **Boarding:** Pirates successfully board a vessel with the intent to hijack it but their attempt to take control of the vessel or kidnap crewmember(s) and / or passenger(s) failed
- > **Attack:** Vessel was attacked with gunfire or RPG fire, no boarding was successfully completed
- > **Pirate Action Group (PAG):** Sighting or reporting of firearms and boarding equipment on board a suspicious vessel or sighting of a confirmed pirate mother ship
- > **Criminal boarding:** Vessel boarded with criminal intent, theft does not have to occur
- > **Suspicious approach:** Suspicious activity reported (i.e. a vessel was approached by unidentified skiff(s) with one or more persons on board)

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## LIMITATION

Our opinion and advice are given on the basis of the information given to us in our instructions and the surrounding circumstances known to us to exist at the time when those instructions are given. We do not accept responsibility for verifying the information or investigating beyond its limits. Subsequent changes to relevant information or to the surrounding circumstances may affect the reliability of our opinion and advice but we do not accept responsibility for that effect. We do not accept responsibility for the outcome of action taken or not taken as a result of our opinion and advice unless the possibility of that action being taken or not taken is set out in specific terms in our instructions.

Since 1990 we have been committed to helping clients understand the threats to their people, information, property and reputation. Our global team provides you with the expertise to mitigate and manage security risks so that you can effectively meet objectives and focus on opportunities.

#### COMMITTED

We develop long-term, collaborative client partnerships, that put you in greater control. Our commitment to an immediate response when you need us offers certainty and peace of mind.

#### GLOBAL

We are a global team that provides a local service. With extensive resources on the ground around the world, we understand your culture and speak your language.

#### EXPERTISE

We attract and develop the highest calibre of specialists. Our team has wide experience of the evolving challenges faced by every industry sector around the world.

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