Crisis24

Transit Guidelines: Transits, Ports and Anchorages Within Southeast Asia



Prepared for
V Ships

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Part 1 Summary of Guidance

1.1 Executive Summary

- Crisis24 recorded approximately 94 maritime security incidents across Southeast Asia (SEA) in 2022. 85 of these incidents were classed as criminal boardings, accounting for 91% of the regions total. This is a slight decrease from the 98% in 2021 and 2020, however a large increase from the 61% and 77% totals of 2019 and 2018 respectively
- As has been the trend in recent years, incidents on board vessels transiting the Singapore Strait continue to increase – with at least 51 cases recorded over reporting period (55% of total). This is a 24% increase compared to the same time period in 2021
- There were no recorded incident of extended duration cargo theft (EDCT) in 2022, as has been the case over the last five years
- The Sulu / Celebes seas continue to act as the preferred theatre of operation for the Islamist militant Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). However, regional security operations continue to prove successful in disrupting the group's maritime activities, and no hijacks conducted by the stated group were reported in 2022
- In September 2022, ReCAAP adapted its 21 November 2016 advisory in accordance with the assessed decrease in threat level for abduction of crew from vessels in the Celebes Sea and Sulu Sea to moderate

1.2 Summary of Guidance

DETER:

- Recognise risk and establish 'crew mind-set' prior to going into the SEA High Risk Area (HRA). Crew alertness and awareness should be of the highest standard. Conduct regular and rigorous training prior to entry into the region
- All risk assessments are to be tailored to the region
- Protect vessel, transit and cargo information wherever possible
- Work with all commercial parties and Owners to ensure best time of arrival within charter party agreements. Transit into the area only when necessary

DETECT:

- Accurate and timely situational intelligence is vital to any safe and secure transit throughout the region. In SEA there is a constantly shifting area of threat – have a process to monitor information sources accordingly
- Establish stringent watch routines and increase lookouts when in the HRA

DELAY:

- Any access points across the stern, decks and anchor chains should be properly defended with physical security deterrents. A vessel underway is not sufficient to deter piracy

RESPOND:

- Have a clear decision-making process, ensure all crew understand what to do during an attack or attempted attack. Ensure all methods of communicating to crew are simple and will be easily heard and quickly understood during a noisy and stressful situation by conducting rehearsals
- When necessary enact rehearsed procedures for secure area use – on orders ensure all crew move to the secure area and ensure message of attack is passed
- Compliance / submission to attackers is advised if the vessel is taken and the secure area is breached

Part 2 Piracy Guidance – Actions Required for Safety and Security

2.1 General Counter-Piracy Guidance

- Evidence suggests attacks are intelligence led with particular products targeted in well organised attacks. With this in mind, communications should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points or waiting positions

- A moving vessel is a more effective deterrent. Even if told to drift prior to loading, steaming is advised. Avoid, whenever possible, coastal navigation in high-risk areas

2.2 Vessel Procedure Prior to Entry of HRA

- All vessels must carry out a risk assessment before entering the HRA. The risk assessment is to be carried out in accordance with BMP guidance and the Shipboard Security Plan (SSP) 6.2. Risk assessments should examine likelihood and consequences of a vessel robbery and piracy incident. *See Section 4.1 for further details*

- Brief all personnel on their duties and the latest security risks in the area including vessel hardening techniques and piracy trends. Such knowledge and preparedness can assist in successful prevention of robbery and piracy incidents

- Ensure the contingency plan and ship security plan are known and extensively rehearsed with contact details and prepared messages for emergency use. Ensure you have most up to date emergency contact details and check call if necessary

- Compartmentalise sensitive information (for example cargo, volume of cargo etc.) to ensure confidentiality and security of the vessel

- Ensure that regular background checks on local crew are conducted to ensure their credibility

- Primary and secondary means of communication are to be checked. Tests should be regularly conducted on the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) in compliance with ISPS code and IMO guidelines. Checks and familiarisation by crew should be carried out before entry into the HRA

- Run additional machinery such as extra generators and steering motors

- Ensure all entrances and exits are usable and secure an internal compartment to be used as a

citadel by the crew if necessary

- Vessel hardening in a layered defence consisting of locking all exterior doors / windows, fences, razor wire and the arrangement of cargo to minimise entry points, if correctly deployed, can significantly increase the difficulty of access. Ensure this is planned and conducted prior to arrival in the HRA. *See Section 4.1 for further details*

- Control of access (including emergency exits) into and out of the accommodation, storerooms and engine room should be restricted when transiting in higher risk areas of SEA (but in such a way that allows accesses to be easily unlocked in case of emergency) as in line with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) guidance. See *Section 4.2 for further details*

- When not in use, mooring ropes and wires should be stowed on reels or kept below deck to prevent boarding access onto the vessel and to minimise the risk of theft

- Procedures should be implemented to log security patrols of crews, the management of keys in a secure cupboard and the checking of vessel hardening measures to be carried out shortly before entry into the HRA

- Conduct training exercises to drill crew on piracy attacks and additional emergency drills such as, but not limited to, fire drills with full hardening measures in place. Crew should rehearse to familiarise escape routes and doors and hatches which are not accessible or restricted

- Maintenance conducted outside of the superstructure should be strictly controlled and reduced to a minimum to restrict risk to crew and to ensure hardened access points are not compromised. Tools and equipment must be stored in a secure location to prevent theft and any potential for their usage if a pirate group were to successfully board the vessel

- Ensure that regular checks are conducted within the storerooms, particularly the bosun store, forecastle store and paint store, the steering gear room and engine room due to the threat of criminal boardings

- Ensure that the ship security officer conducts random inspections and checks of the vessel, crew, and cargo

2.3 Vessels Calling at Ports and/or Anchorages within SEA

- Prior to entering the HRA ensure increased all-round watch routine is established and that radars are properly manned and operated to keep a lookout. Vigilance and regular changeovers of watches should be undertaken to remain alert

- Vessels, whenever possible, should maintain a distance of at least 25NM from the coastline due to the risks of groundings and opportunistic thefts conducted by local pirate/criminal groups. Recorded incidents in the region indicate that piracy activity is uncommon away from the coastlines of regional states. From 2019-2021 there was an exception of piracy further offshore in the Sulu / Celebes seas area however, in 2022 this trend was not the case as no such incidents were recorded in the stipulated seas

- Vessels should avoid arriving at port when not immediately conducting cargo operations if possible. The vessel should liaise closely with its commercial operator to ensure that a valid Notice of Readiness is tendered and contractual obligations are met

- Contact with the Port Control and other Port Authorities is kept to the necessary minimum

- Where appropriate liaise with the coastal state, ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre and Information Fusion Centre (*Section 4.3 for further details*) for updates and situational awareness - **see British Admiralty Chart Q6112 and Q6113**

- Minimise use of VHF. Use email or secure satellite telephone. Only answer known or legitimate communications (VHF, email other), bearing in mind that imposters are likely. Imposters may even appear in military fatigues

- Reduce Automated Identification System (AIS) data to the minimum required. Do not include any cargo details

- For email correspondence to Agents, Charterers, Chandlers etc. it is strongly recommended that address lists be controlled and that information within the email is concise, containing the minimum that is legally required in order to fulfil requirements or contractual obligations

- Know your agents. Avoid or minimise information requirements where possible, the more interaction with other parties opens opportunities for intelligence regarding the vessel's location to be compromised and complicate the number of callers

- Attacks can happen at any time. The majority of attacks take place at night, early morning and late afternoon. It is advisable to approach ports during daytime only

- At night, and if static, consider using hoses as a deterrence to small boats encroaching the vessel. Sufficient lighting and searchlights around the vessel is a source of deterrence to robbers in port and anchorages

- Where practicable a prolonged stay at anchorage is to be avoided due to the heightened threat of criminal boardings. Over the course of 2022, approximately 29 of the 89 criminal boarding incidents (33%) occurred while vessels were berthed or at anchor. This is broadly aligned with the 2021 incidents, whereby 39% of the vessels where boarded whilst also either berthed or anchored.

- If conducting an STS operation, then where practicable offer a choice of rendezvous locations. Advise rendezvous points at the last minute and if waiting keep well off the coast (up to 200NM). Do not give away waiting positions. Avoid waiting and slow steaming where possible. Attacks have taken place in pilot boarding areas

- At anchor, or if conducting STS operations, it is vital that a full radar and visual lookout is maintained. An early warning of any approaching craft is essential in order to give vessel personnel time to respond or to retreat to a Safe Muster Point / Secure Area

- If possible, night-time operations at anchor or for Ship-to-Ship Transfer (STS) operations are not advisable. For prolonged operations consider daytime operations only, even if this means two or more STS to complete the operation. At night, it would be recommended to depart the area and to steam away from the coastline

- Slow steaming (less than 10 knots) is not recommended while transiting the HRA

- Pirates have boarded via Yokahama fenders on vessels engaged in STS operations or even via anchor chains / hawse pipes. When at anchor, hawse pipe covers must be properly secured. Consider keeping the anchor washers running

- If the vessel is a regular caller to the region, alter arrangements to make it harder for the criminals to predict where operations might take place. Do not become complacent

2.4 Vessels Operating Transits Within Proximity to the Singapore Straits

- Maintain a vigilant watch and lighting at all times and minimise time spent in anchorages or drifting

- Keep unnecessary communications to a minimum – particularly VHF communications

- Do not respond to any unknown VHF transmissions or to any unknown email correspondence

- Where practicable consider the use of daytime transits as it allows a greater field of visions for watch keepers and any suspicious vessels can be seen more easily. For instance, get started in daylight and conclude / leave in daylight if possible. Full speed transits are recommended

- Maintain a high level of vigilance and implement full ship protection measures. Enhance the lookout and assign additional crew to anti-piracy watch during night time hours, including designated personnel for the radar watch

- On 28 November 2022, ReCAAP reported a total of 51 incidents in the Singapore Strait since January 2022. Compared to the same period for 2021, there has been an increase of 10 incidents (24%) this year. Particular clusters of incidents within the Singapore Strait include those off Tanjung Pergam, Bintan Island (13 incidents), off Pulau Karimun Kecil (11 incidents) and off Pulau Nongsa, Batam Island (10 incidents). ReCAAP ISC alerted the maritime community on the continued occurrence of the incidents of sea robbery to vessels while underway in the Singapore Strait. Consequently, all vessels are advised to intensify vigilance and maintain look-out while transiting the areas of concern, particularly during hours of darkness, adopt preventive measures and report all incidents immediately to the nearest coastal State.

2.5. Vessels Operating Transits Through the Sibutu Passage

- Since March 2016, ReCAAP ISC was deeply concerned with the increase in the number of incidents of abduction of crew for ransom in the Sulu-Celebes Seas and waters off Eastern Sabah, publishing an incident alert on the subject on 21 November 2016. With concerted efforts undertaken by the Philippine, Malaysian and Indonesian authorities since, no abduction of crew incidents have been reported since January 2020; with no crew currently held in captivity. In May 2022 the threat level for the abduction of crew was downgraded from ‘high’ to ‘potentially high’ and on 21 September 2022, it was further adjusted to ‘moderate’. This is based on the perception that despite the presence of the remnants of the terrorist group in the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi, continued ground military operations in the region have worked to reduce the strength of the perpetrators to conduct kidnap for ransom at sea. However, advice continues to be for vessels to consider re-routing from the area as an option based on its prerogative. For ship masters and crew who are transiting the area, high vigilance continues to be best practice, with any incident to be reported to the Operation Centres of the Philippines and ESSCOM.

- If a transit must continue, ReCAAP advised that masters and crew exercise the following advice:
    - Enhance vigilance, maximise alertness of lookouts and increase watch keeping
    - Maintain continuous communication with shipping company and enforcement agencies for monitoring and immediate responses in any eventualities
    - Control the access to bridge, accommodation, and machinery spaces
    - Sound alarm when sighting suspicious boats or suspicious persons on board in the vicinity
    - Avoid confrontation with perpetrators
    - Look out for advisories issued on NAVTEX
    - Report all incidents to the nearest coastal state and flag state

- ReCAAP ISC advise that, before entering the Sibutu Passage, vessels report to the Operation Centre of the Philippine Coast Guard and the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) in

Malaysia. The updated contact details can be found below.

- **Philippine Coast Guard - Southwestern Mindanao Operation Centre**
  - Tel: +63 998 585 7972 / +63 917 842 8446
  - VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign “NEPTUNE”
  - Email: hcgdswm@yahoo.com

- **Philippines Navy - Littoral Monitoring Station (LMS), Bongao, Tawi-Tawi**
  - Tel: +63 955 714 0153
  - VHF: Channel 16
  - Email: jointtaskgroup@gmail.com

- **Philippine Coast Guard Station - Bongao, Central Tawi-Tawi**
  - Tel: +63 998 585 7941 / +63 917 842 8402
  - VHF: Channel 16
  - Email: cgd_tawi2@yahoo.com

- **Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM)**
  - Tel: +60 898 631 81 / 016 Fax: +60 898 63182
  - VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign “ESSCOM”
  - Email: bilikgerakan_esscom@jpm.gov.my

- Further guidelines for vessels transiting in the Sulu / Celebs seas may be found in section 2.8 Regional Initiatives

2.6 Actions in the Attempt of an Attack/Attempted Boarding – ‘Stop – Think – Act’

- Report incident immediately to nearest coastal state, vessel owner, authorities, and vessels within the vicinity. Remain in continuous contact if possible

- Go through rehearsed procedures. Sound the emergency alarm, turn on all lighting and whistle / foghorn. Alerting crew and demonstrating to attackers that the vessel is alert, aware and reacting to their attack

- If not already at full speed, remain on a straight bearing and increase to maximum speed. If time permits attempt to make small alterations in course and if sea conditions allow, expose attacking skiffs to winds / wash. Avoid excessive manoeuvres that will impede speed

- All non-essential bridge and engine room crew should muster at the citadel or pre-designated Safe Muster Point

- Incident report **MUST** be made directly to the nominated authorities:

- In addition, contact the nearest coastal state / law enforcement agency:

ICC/IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia:

Tel: +60 3 2078 5763 Fax: +60 3 2078 5769
E-mail: imbkl@icc-ccs.org/piracy@icc-ccs.org
The Centre's 24 Hours Anti-Piracy HELPLINE is: +60 3 2031 0014

Information Fusion Centre (IFC), Singapore:

Tel: +65 9626 8965 (Out of hours) / +65 6594 5728 (Office hours)
Email: ifc_do@defence.gov.sg

In addition, contact the nearest coastal state / law enforcement agency:

AUSTRALIA - Australian Maritime Border Operations Centre Maritime Border Command
Tel: +61 2 6275 6000 Email: MBC_NCU@abf.gov.au

BANGLADESH - Bangladesh Department of Shipping:
Tel: +88 02 955 4206 Email: nse.ahsan@dos.gov.bd

BRUNEI - Brunei Police Marine:
Tel: +673-2773548 Email: marine@police.gov.bn

CAMBODIA - Merchant Marine Department
Tel: +855-77-331-531 Email: dararith.hg@gmail.com

CHINA - China Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination (Beijing)
Tel: +86-10-6529-2218/19/21 Email: cnmrcc@mot.gov.cn

CHINA - Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (Hong Kong)
Tel: +85-2-2233-7999 Email: hkmrcc@mardep.gov.hk

INDIA – Indian Coast Guard
Tel: +91 22 2431 6558 E-mail: mrcc-west@indiancoastguard.nic.in

INDONESIA – RCC Basarnas
Tel: +62 21 65701116 E-mail:basarnas@basarnas.go.id/kagahar@basarnas.go.id

MALAYSIA – MRCC Putrajaya
Tel: +60 2 8941 2140 Email: mrccputrajaya@mmea.gov.my

MYANMAR – MRCC Ayeyarwaddy (Myanmar Navy)
Tel: +95 313 1651 Email: mrcc.yangon@mptmail.com.mm

PHILIPPINES - Philippine Coast Guard
Tel: +632-8-527-3877 (loc 6136/6137) Email: pcgcomcen@coastguard.gov.ph

SINGAPORE - Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
Tel: +65-6226-5539 Email: pocc@mpa.gov.sg

THAILAND - Royal Thai Navy
Tel: +66 2475 4532 E-mail: sornchon2558@gmail.com

VIETNAM - Vietnam Coast Guard
Tel: +84-24-3355-4378 E-mail: vietnamcoastguard@gmail.com

- Ensure the vessel AIS is switched ON

- If the boats continue to within 600m, initiate the ship pre-prepared emergency procedures. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), alerting your CSO and flag state. Broadcast a 'Mayday' call on VHF Ch.16 (156.8 MHz) and a distress message via Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C (if applicable)

2.7 Action in the Event of Boarding

- Ensure that engine is stopped; all crew should proceed to the citadel or pre-designated Safe Muster Point

- Establish communication with the relevant Coast Guard and confirm all crewmembers are accounted for in the citadel or Safe Muster Point. Lock all internal doors on route

- Stay in the citadel or Safe Muster Point until conditions force you to leave or are advised by the military

- If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates have full control of the vessel

- **Compliance / submission to attackers is essential once a vessel is taken.** Violence is uncommon but does occur in hijacking and boardings. Captured crewmembers should keep their hands visible and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence

2.8 Regional Initiatives

- The Indonesia Marine Police (POLAIR) has designated ten established and safe anchorages to be "monitored and patrolled regularly". These anchorages were outlined the Yacht Safety Advisory No 06-19 in 2019 and remain current as of January 2023. The anchorages are:

  (1) Belawan: 03:55.00N - 098:45.30E
  (2) Dumai: 01:42.00N - 101:28.00E
  (3) Nipah: 01:07.30N - 103:37.00E
  (4) Tanjung Berakit / Bintan: 01:23.30N - 104:42.30E
  (5) Tanjung Priok: 06:00.30S - 106:54.00E
  (6) Gresik: 07:09.00S - 112:40.00E
  (7) Taboneo: 03:41.30S - 114:28.00E
  (8) Adang bay: 01:40.00S - 116:40.00E
  (9) Muara Berau: 00:17.00S - 117:36.00E
  (10) Balikpapan: 01:22.00S - 116:53.00E

  - The POLAIR advises all vessels intending to anchor to do so within these anchorages to ensure patrols can be concentrated in select areas to prevent and deter piracy. They further advise that vessels maintain a strict anti-piracy watch and measures, as well as report all attacks and suspicious sightings to local authorities and the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre

  - On 19 June 2017 the Philippines Department of National Defence announced that Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines launched a trilateral maritime patrol agreement to deter and combat piracy in Sulu / Celebes seas (INDOMALPHI). In October 2017, air patrols were also launched in the area. This cooperation has improved communication, coordination, and information-sharing between the three countries across the tri-border area over the past five years. The three countries remain committed to the initiative as demonstrated through multiple meetings in 2021 and 2022. In March 2022 a ministerial meeting was held whereby four categories of patrol enhancements were announced, including that of optimising communication by deploying a liaison officer from each partner nation to each country's maritime command centre; conducting trilateral maritime exercises; adopting an intelligence-led approach to surveillance operations; and improving the trilateral cooperative arrangement structure, communication and coordination to increase partners' participation and commitment

  - As part of INDOMALPHI's original framework detailed in June 2017, the Philippine Coast Guard issued a Notice to Mariners (NTM) on 02 August 2017 - NTM Nr 148-2017 indicating transit corridors to serve as safety areas that will be patrolled by the three countries. On 14 August 2017 the Marine Department of Malaysia also issued an NTM (NTM 14 of 2017 for Sabah region) listing the coordinates of the transit corridor for commercial shipping covering the maritime areas of concern. The vessel reporting system was also included in the NTM. This remains current as of January 2023. The areas of transit corridors of these two NTMs are shown in the map below.



Image 1: Transit Corridors for Commercial Shipping
Source: ReCAAP Guidance for the Abduction of Crew

- Philippine Coast Guard NTM Nr 148-2017, dated 02 August 2017, designated the limit of the safety areas as bounded by the following coordinates:

    - Point ID 1: 08:50:40N - 123:00:00E
    - Point ID 2: 05:59:36N - 119:48:59E
    - Point ID 5: 05:53:36N - 119:47:06E
    - Point ID 6: 05:07:45N - 119:35:02E
    - Point ID 7: 04:23:00N - 119:35:00E
    - Point ID 11: 04:28:08N - 119:42:00E
    - Point ID 12: 05:04:35N - 119:42:00E
    - Point ID 13: 05:56:30N - 119:56:00E
    - Point ID 3: 06:00:00N - 118:50:00E
    - Point ID 4: 05:52:36N - 118:57:34E
    - Point ID 8: 04:23:00N - 119:46:54E

  - Point ID 9: 06:13:33N - 122:27:00E
  - Point ID 10: 06:17:14N - 122:20:00E
  - Point ID 14: 07:32:43N - 121:43:00E
  - Point ID 15: 06:55:00N - 121:43:00E
  - Point ID 16: 06:40:00N - 122:20:00E
  - Point ID 17: 06:41:28N - 122:27:00E
  - Point ID 18: 06:56:28N - 121:50:00E
  - Point ID 19: 07:38:58N - 121:50:00E
  - Point ID 20: 08:41:16N - 123:00:00E

- Marine Department of Malaysia Sabah Region NTM 14 of 2017, dated 14 August 2017, is addressed to vessels in the area of common concern with the following coordinates:

  - Point A: 07:11:00N - 118:32:00E
  - Point B: 05:48:00N - 120:30:00E
  - Point C: 04:48:00N - 120:30:00E
  - Point D: 03:11:33N - 119:23:52E
  - Point E: 03:56:00N - 118:22:30E
  - Point F: 05:21:00N - 119:21:30E
  - Point G: 06:21:00N - 117:57:00E

- NTM 14 of 2017 states that all vessels are required to render reports to the National Coast Watch Centre, LMS Bongao, Maritime Command Centre Philippines, Coast Guard Action Centre, Naval Operation Centre, Maritime Command Centre Malaysia and Maritime Command Centre Indonesia at least 24 hours before arrival at the designated maritime areas of common concern, with complete vessel routing information

- Contact Details for agencies listed above:

  While transiting the Philippines' area of responsibility:

  - **National Coast Watch Centre (NCWC)**:
    Tel: +63 (2) 241-2937 / 3104 Email: fusioncenter@ncwc.gov.ph

  - **Navy Operation Centre (NOC), Philippine Navy**:
    Tel: +63 (917) 8512708 / +63 (2) 5244981 Email: noc@nav.ph / hpn.noc@navy.mil.ph

  - **Coast Guard Action Centre (CGAC), Philippine Coast Guard**
    Tel: +63 (917) 7243682 / +63 (2) 5273877 Email: pcgcomcen@coastguard.gov.ph

  - **Naval Forces Western Mindanao Operation Centre**
    Tel: +63 (917) 6860681 Email: nfwm.nfoc@navy.mil.ph / nfoc@wm@gmail.com

- **Maritime Research Information Centre (MRIC)**
  Tel: +63 (917) 7085248 / +63 (2) 8431833 Email: mric@nav.ph

While transiting Malaysia's area of responsibility:

- **Maritime Command Centre (MCC), Tawau Malaysia**
  Tel: +6089 775600 / +6089 779777 / +6089 982623 (1700-0800) Email: mcctawau2@gmail.com

- **Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM)**
  Tel: +60 898 631 81 / 016 Email: bilikgerakan_esscom@jpm.gov.my

- **Marine Department Malaysia, Sabah Region**
  Tel: +6088 401111 Email: aisjlsbh@marine.gov.my

While transiting Indonesia's area of responsibility:

- **Maritime Command Centre (MCC), Tarakan Indonesia**
  Tel: +625513806288/ +625513806289 Email: mcctarakan2@gmail.com / mcc_tarakan@tnial.mid.id

- NTM 14 of 2017 instructs that the following procedure shall be completed upon entering the maritime areas of common concern upon establishment of radio contact with the monitoring station:

  "SECURITY, SECURITY…THIS IS (NAME OF VESSEL)

  I AM ENTERING (NAME OF SEA LANE, EX: SIBUTU PASSAGE, ALICE CHANNEL, ETC.)

  WITH A SPEED OF __ AND COURSE __.

  PRESENT POSITION: (LATITUDE / LONGITUDE) OR AT VICINITY (NEAREST POINT OF REFERENCE)

  STATUS: (I.E. UNDERWAY, ALL IS WELL, UNDER ATTACK OR IN DISTRESS)"

  ***If under attack, request immediate assistance / rescue.**

- The NTM states that all vessels in the area of common concern are required to pass through the designated transit corridors / sea lanes, with the following coordinates:

  - Point ID 1: 06:09:15.8N - 119:59:46.0E
  - Point ID 2: 05:59:36.0N - 119:48:59.0E
  - Point ID 3: 05:59:36.0N - 118:27:08.3E
  - Point ID 4: 05:21:00.0N - 119:21:30.0E
  - Point ID 5: 04:44:59.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - Point ID 6: 04:03:30.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - Point ID 9: 03:56:30.0N - 118:56:30.0E
  - Point ID 16: 03:59:14.0N - 119:00:30.0E
  - Point ID 17: 04:39:43.0N - 119:00:30.0E
  - Point ID 7: 04:03:00.0N - 118:27:21.5E
  - Point ID 8: 03:56:00.0N - 118:22:30.0E
  - Point ID 10: 03:44:12.5N - 118:38:46.8E
  - Point ID 11: 03:39:48.6N - 118:44:51.1E
  - Point ID 12: 04:52:45.7N - 120:30:00.0E
  - Point ID 13: 05:01:16.7N - 120:30:00.0E
  - Point ID 14: 04:28:08.0N - 119:42:00.0E
  - Point ID 15: 04:23:16.0N - 119:35:00.0E
  - Point ID 23: 05:04:35.0N - 119:35:02.0E
  - Point ID 24: 05:04:35.0N - 119:42:00.0E
  - Point ID 18: 05:19:00.0N - 119:28:37.0E
  - Point ID 19: 05:25:04.0N - 119:28:37.0E
  - Point ID 20: 05:52:36.0N - 118:49:51.9E
  - Point ID 21: 05:52:36.0N - 119:47:06.0E
  - Point ID 22: 05:07:45.0N - 119:35:02.0E
  - Point ID 25: 05:56:30.0N - 119:56:00.0E
  - Point ID 26: 06:05:08.0N - 120:05:38.5E

- All vessels are required to render POSREP and SITREP as they enter the maritime areas of common concern, and every hour or as necessary

- The NTM Nr 148-2017 and NTM 14 of 2017 areas remain current as of January 2023

Part 3 Background Data and Analysis (2022)

3.1 South East Asia High Risk Area

- As of 4 November 2022, the Joint Cargo Committee continues to rate Indonesia, and the Malay Peninsula (Singapore Strait in its entirety and South China Sea bound at 4' north, 1' north to the south and 106' east to the east) at an elevated risk
- The JWC zones, however, do not reflect the true scale of the SEA HRA, below is a zone representative of all piracy in SEA during 2015 which is still relevant

Image 2: Representative zone of all piracy in the SEA HRA (2020-2022)
Source: Crisis24

3.2 Pirate Areas of Operation

- **Concentration area**: In 2022, approximately 20% of SEA piracy incidents were concentrated at regional ports and anchorages, all of which were criminal boardings, although the majority of incidents still occur close to shore. A year-on-year decrease in incidents occurring at ports and anchorages has been evident in the SEA region. This has been seen with there being 39% of SEA piracy incidents concentrated at regional ports and anchorages in 2021, 60% in 2020, 61% in 2019

and 70% in 2018. This has been countered by yearly increases in the number of incidents targeting transiting vessels, the vast majority of which have occurred in the Singapore Strait. In 2022, 54 incidents have been reported in this maritime area, accounting for 57% of all piracy incidents within the SEA region. This depicting a 24% increase from the number of incidents in the same area for 2021

- 'Significant' piracy incidents (boarding, hijacking, PAG sighting and attack) remain most likely in the Sulu / Celebes seas surrounding the Sulu Archipelago, Philippines, where ASG and associated criminal groups operate, although activity between 2020 - 2022 has remained low compared to previous years. In 2022, only one hijacking was reported on 24 April whereby an unknown armed man boarded a fishing vessel 2NM North of Tawitati Island, Philippines. The perpetrator entered the wheelhouse, disconnected the communications equipment prior to taking the steering wheel and stopping the vessel. Multiple other armed men, some wearing uniforms with police logo, also boarded the vessel and hijacked it. The hijackers released three crewmembers and demanded RM65,000 (approximately USD14,400) for the release of the remaining crew and vessel.

- **Northern:** In previous years, the Sulu / Celebes seas were the focus of significant piracy activity (other than criminal boardings) due to the presence of ASG and linked criminal groups. However, due to a lack of reported activity over recent years, the threat level was changed in September 2022 to "moderate". Advisory to all vessels to consider re-route from the area as an option based on its prerogative. For ship masters and crew who are transiting the area, they are strongly encouraged to exercise extra vigilance and report immediately to the Operation Centres of the Philippines and ESSCOM.

- **Eastern**: The east of the SEA HRA has not recorded a significant incident since the 25 February 2015 cargo theft-motivated hijacking of the REHOBOT tanker 10NM northeast of Pulau Lembeh, Indonesia. In 2022, a 50% decrease in the number of incidents has been recorded for the eastern region, with a total of four incidents, three being criminal boardings and located off different anchorages

- **Western:** There were no recorded hijackings within the Malacca Strait in 2021 as has been the precedent since 2015, despite two outlier incidents between April – August 2018 targeting fishing trawlers within 3NM of the Malaysian coast. The Singapore Strait presents the primary threat to commercial shipping as outlined previously; 51 have been recorded in the stretch of water over 2022. Bulk carriers are most targeted, but tankers and vessels towing barges of raw materials and scrap metals are also favoured by criminals. The primary objective of the criminals in these cases is to theft vessel's equipment and crewmembers are highly unlikely to be targeted for maritime kidnap in this area

- **Southern:** While a significant piracy incident in the south of the SEA HRA has not been recorded since May 2016, port, and anchorage areas in 2022 saw a total of four criminal boardings. There

were no recorded incidents that took place in excess of 5NM from the coastlines. Three of the four (75%) of the criminal boarding incidents in the southern region over this period occurred in and around Jakarta although cases have also routinely occurred in neighbouring anchorages in recent years. As with the wider SEA region, perpetrators typically board vessels with the intent of stealing property, and incidents rarely escalate into violence. In one incident this year a perpetrator was reported to have boarded the vessel with a knife, however, no injuries or fatalities of crewmembers were reported

- **Range**: Incidents in SEA continue to occur mainly in anchorages, ports, and traffic separation schemes where vessels are transiting close to the coastline or at anchor. Historic hijackings and extended duration cargo thefts occur within 50NM of the baseline coast or islands; however, a minority have occurred in excess of 100NM. The close proximity to shore of such incidents was illustrated by the single hijack that occurred 2NM north of Tawitati Island, Philippines on 24 April 2022. There was one outlying incident in 2022 which was the fishing vessel boarding that took place 184NM NW of Puerto Princesa, Philippines on 9 September 2022.

- **Time**: The overwhelming majority of incidents were recorded at night, as most obviously demonstrated through criminal boardings of large vessels in the Singapore Strait but also at regional ports and anchorages. As previously stated, vessels in the SEA region are most at risk of piracy during the late evening and early morning from 1930-0645. Contrary to other incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the region which take place mostly during hours of darkness, several incidents involving abduction of crew in the Sulu-Celebes Seas and waters off Eastern Sabah have historically occurred during daylight hours, specifically between 0700-1800. This can partially be attributed to the perpetrators wanting to minimise search and abduction efforts of crewmembers once having boarded the targeted vessel.

3.3 Overview of Attacks

- SEA piracy is divided between two distinct piracy/criminal groups: highly organised hijackers conducting sophisticated intelligence-led operations, being selective in the targets they attack; and opportunistic port and anchorage criminal boardings

- Violence against resisting crew is rare. Restraining crewmembers with rope or locking them in rooms is more common. However, the ASG use violence against crewmembers if they attempt to resist abduction, especially in incidents in the Sulu and Celebes seas. Although such incidents have become rare in recent years, this assessment remains unchanged in any event involving the group

3.4 Sea Categories of Attack

- The level of pirate activity within SEA may broadly be split into the following categories:

- **Criminal Boardings**: Often carried out in the evening or early morning when in port or anchorage. Although the least severe and violent of all piracy incidents, previous incidents have involved the use of weaponry, including machetes, long knives (as was seen on 7 January 2022, 15NM NE of Batam, Indonesia, when a criminal boarded a tanker armed with a knife) and handguns. The intention of such robberies is to acquire crew valuables (smart phones, laptops etc.), vessels' stores and equipment and, in the case of the Singapore Strait, scrap metals and raw materials. Thefts occur most commonly within storerooms, the forecastle, engine room and steering gear room

- In criminal boardings, pirates approach the vessel in fast moving small craft from astern to avoid forward looking radar and lookouts. Pirates boarding methods to reach the deck include grappling hooks with ropes attached, poles with hooks, climbing on the yokohama fenders or via mooring lines. Once boarded, perpetrators can complete operations within six minutes and often remain undetected, although at times are discovered within the superstructure or sighted leaving the vessel with stolen property. Pirates are willing to threaten and temporarily detain crewmembers that disrupt them whilst in the process of their operations. However, if the alarm is raised by a crewmember, pirates are likely to vacate the vessel at speed and are willing to jump overboard regardless of freeboard

- **Extended Duration Cargo Theft (EDCT)**: Tanker hijackings with the motive of large-scale cargo theft have remained a threat to product tankers throughout SEA since April 2014 although recorded incidents have fallen significantly over the last several years. EDCT are almost solely related to product and chemical tankers (less than 5000GT). Vessels have previously been hijacked for between three to seven days and cargo discharged to a smaller vessel. At least three organised groups or syndicates were previously known to operate in the South China seas and Malacca Strait. However, no EDCT incident has been reported since 2017 when three hijacking incidents involved vessels targeted for their cargo: two vessels for diesel oil and one for palm oil. Although this is so, it is a threat that perpetrators have capacity to follow through with and should still be considered into 2023

- **Kidnapping**: The majority of kidnapped crewmembers taken since 2014 have been abducted by ASG in the Sulu and Celebes seas. Looking at this area specifically, and the concern relating to it, ReCAAP ISC published an incident alert for the increasing cases of abduction of crew from vessels in 2016 and labelled the threat as 'high'. In September 2022 this threat level has been changed to 'moderate'. This level implies that incidents are possible to occur but are relatively less severe in nature. Vessels are thus to consider re-routing from this area as an option and ship masters and crew who are transiting are strongly encouraged to exercise extra vigilance and report immediately to the Operation Centres of the Philippines and ESSCOM.

3.5 Analysis on EDCT

There were no EDCT incidents recorded in 2022, the fifth consecutive year without a recorded incident. However according to ReCAAP, from 2011-2017 a total of 40 cargo theft incidents were reported in Asia, with more than half being in the South China seas. Since April 2014, more than 3.5 million metric tonnes (MT) of refined petroleum products have been stolen from product tankers. From 2012-2013 the record of successful cargo theft hijackings was mixed, with less than half being successful. Although it has not been a high risk over the previous several years, it is still a concern going into 2023 as perpetrators have depicted ability to follow through with such actions in the past. By providing an overview of past such hijackings, vessel owners, crew and captain are able to follow through with appropriate mitigation measures for such incidents

- **Scale of Fuel Theft:** The estimated value of fuel smuggling in SEA was estimated in January 2018 to be between USD2-3 billion per year. Fuel is a particular concern in the Singapore Strait, the coast of Vietnam and the Indonesian Archipelago. The illegal fuel trade is also becoming increasingly sophisticated as shipping vessels are transformed to accommodate the transport of fuel

- **Bunker Theft:** The large-scale theft of bunkered oil is highly organised, and intelligence driven, with selected vessels targeted with collaboration with unknown industry or government officials providing information on vessels' location and contents. After such hijackings, the pirates report back to their senior commanders and arrange the sale of cargo and rendezvous point for STS transfer

3.6 Analysis on EDCT Hijackings

Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) have previously operated in large numbers, with 6-10 or more pirates per attack, to overwhelm and immediately suppress any crew on board. Vessels are approached at high speed and boarded with minimal force so as not to alert the crew. EDCT-motivated attacks throughout 2015-2016 showed highly developed awareness of the crew usage of vessel communication and tracking systems as well as the STS transfer processes. It is known that pirate gangs and syndicates have accessibility to type of cargo carried by victim vessels, route undertaken and type of equipment on board to facilitate siphoning.

Vessels hijacked with the intention of EDCT are steered away from high density shipping lanes and in a minority of cases vessels are repainted and names altered to avoid detection. In the hijackings of the ORAPIN 4, DANAI 4 and ZAFIRAH, the identity of the vessel was physically painted over and in the case of the ZAFIRAH its IMO number was also changed. Typically, crew are tied up or locked away in staterooms or a cabin and may suffer physical violence and intimidation. A minority of pirate cells will cast crew adrift in lifeboats or be thrown overboard to further lower the risk of detection. There is little evidence to suggest that the 'ghost ship' trend of the 1979 to 2005 type, where vessels were hijacked for sale or insurance fraud, has been a motivation in recent years.

Vessels have previously been held for several days as the vessel transits to a prearranged location or tanker / barge comes alongside and begins the siphoning operations. In the majority of past EDCT-motivated incidents, ReCAAP assessed that there was likely already a buyer of cargo. If the pirates leave the vessel without a siphon it is assessed by regional focal points that the pirates had incorrect cargo information or boarded the wrong vessel. Before leaving a vessel, the pirates will loot the vessel of crew properties, vessel properties (including stores and valuable spares) and destroy communication and navigation equipment (if not already destroyed or damaged in the initial hijack).

Part 4 Supporting Information

4.1 Vessel Voyage Rick Assessment and Personnel Protection Considerations

All vessels must carry out a risk assessment before entering the HRA. The risk assessment is to be carried out in accordance with BMP guidance and the Shipboard Security Plan (SSP) 6.2. Form S23 in the Ship Security Plan is to be used for this purpose. It is to be forwarded to the office, and agreed with CSO prior leaving last port before transit of the High Risk Area and shall include as a minimum:

Maximum Information	Additional factors to be considered
• High Risk Areas to be transited and • intended route. • Identify whether the vessel is high risk; all vessels with less that 8 metres freeboard are deemed high risk. • Identify whether a convoy is recommended; identifying the convoy and advise Owners accordingly. • Full details of Ship Protection Measures and any additional equipment required. If armed guards onboard. • If armed guards onboard	• Vessel Type • LoA / breadth Freeboard • Loaded or in ballast Cargo • Full speed • M/E attain > 90% MCR? Nos. of crew • Nos. of supernumerary • Nos. of cadets • Nos. of females • Reduce to non-essential staff? • M/E confirmed OK? • A/E confirmed OK? • Boiler confirmed OK? • Steering gear confirmed OK? • Test of main fire pumps & emergency fire pump confirmed OK? • Relevant drills performed on board? • Master and officers of the watch have been familiarized with the impact of zigzag manoeuvres onboard and in particular the impact that these manoeuvres can have upon reducing the speed of the vessel? • Engine room to be manned during the transit? SSAS test confirmed OK? • North / South bound East / West bound • Latest update of instructions on board? • Latest edition of Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy (BMP) on board? • SAT-C set to the “Indian Ocean Region"? • Latest intelligence regarding piracy attacks and activity on board? • Both citadel and safe muster point confirmed OK (if applies)? • Communication (satellite phone and VHF) in citadel tested and confirmed OK? • All anti-piracy equipment on board (SPM)?

All irregularities to above points shall be reported immediately to the Company. If any irregularities are observed the vessel must not proceed into the special precautionary area without agreement of the Company.

The overall aim of the risk assessment is to minimise the risk of attack and successful hijack. This is achieved through a combination of passage planning, Ship Protection Measures, a prepared crew and good communications between vessel and shore.

Risk assessments to be copied to piracy@vships.com

4.2 Ship Protection Measures (Guidelines)

Different vessels have different requirements, and the overall aim is to achieve the best solution for the individual vessel and transit. This will be identified pre-transit during the risk assessment phase. Before entering the High Risk Area, all anti-piracy measures and equipment shall be implemented and rigged. These anti-piracy measures must be applied throughout the transit of the High Risk Area. The vessel shall not depart the last port of call or anchorage prior to passage of the High Risk Area without agreement on Ship Protection Measures to be implemented.

Equipment	Detail
Sandbags • 150 bags with sand (approx. 15kg each)	The sandbags shall be used for a protective shelter in each of the bridge wings.
Protection • 3 x Steel helmets • 3 x Kevlar jackets • 3 x Safety Glasses	The helmets and Kevlar jackets shall be used times by the watch keeping bridge team whenever suspicious vessels are sighted.
Additional hoses • 16 x hoses 30 m • x foam applicators with eductors 16 x 25 litres foam liquid • 8 x fire main Y-pieces	Fire hoses and applicators shall be rigged, fixed and ready for immediate use throughout the High Risk Area. The foam is a supplement to the already rigged water curtain as per BMP5 section p. 14. On vessels with separate foam line and foam pump this can be used instead of the main fire line and main fire pumps. It is important that the fire hoses cover midship sections of the vessel as well as vessel's quarters and stern.
Razor wire and protective gloves • Sufficient concertina razor wire for two layers covering the full perimeter of the vessel (See diagram). • Sufficient razor wire for rigging in strategic points around the accommodation • Clips/wire ties for rigging above 12 x heavy duty gloves	It is important that the razor wire is rigged in such a way that it covers the opening between the fish plate and the railing thus preventing any attackers from passing below the razor wire. One layer of razor wire shall be rigged in a highly visible position outside the accommodation i.e. along the railing so it can be seen from small skiffs or boats. This layer of razor wire will have a deterrent effect on pirates (razor wire should not obstruct access to life rafts or lifeboat(s).

• 2 x heavy duty wire cutters • Silk wire or steel wire with a diameter of 3 – 4 mm	The silk wire or steel wire shall run through the centre of the coils of razor wire rigged in two layers covering the entire perimeter of the vessel from fore to aft. The silk wire or steel wire must run behind some of the railings vertical posts at regular intervals.
Trailing Lines • 4 coils of cross braded floating PPP line, diameter 6 mm and length 220 meters	Trailing lines can be deployed from the stern of the vessel and forced down to the surface by attaching two 20 litres plastic cans to each line (see diagram).
Night vision binoculars • 2 x pairs	
Dummies / artificial lookouts	Ref BMP5 section p. 11 well-constructed dummies / artificial lookouts must be made and placed at strategic locations around the vessel giving the impression of greater numbers of people on watch.

Use of Foam

- In addition to the effects of a standard hose, the use of a foam or dye mix has the following effects:
    - Ox blood or urine additives used to produce foam are particularly unpleasant for anyone who is covered by the foam – foul smell, sticky, irritant to eyes and respiratory systemsThe use of dye markers could assist in subsequent prosecutions. Where an attack has been unsuccessful, but a subsequent boarding of a suspected pirate skiff takes place, the naval forces could possibly link the pirates to the attack if they detect the presence of non-soluble dye markers
    - A small skiff will become unmanageable more quickly if it is filled or swamped with foam rather than just water
    - A pirate covered in foam will find it significantly more difficult to climb a ladder to board a vessel

Warning on Use of Active Measures

Advice on the use of active counter piracy measures, including use-of-force should be sought from company management and the Flag State authorities.

A ship's Master may be subject to legal proceedings following the use-of-force causing harm to a pirate. Using active measures against pirates may cause injury or harm pirates and may result in an escalation of violence against the vessel. If an attack is successful, the pirates may later take revenge against the crew for any injuries caused during the attack. Care must be exercised when weighing up all options especially when considering the use of force against pirates, before and during an attack. Any force used must be appropriate to the threat, reasonable in the circumstances and justifiable in a court of law at a later time.

Water Curtain / Flooding of Main Deck by Ballast Water Pumps or Main Fire Pumps

Ref. BMP5 p. 14, a water curtain should be established using a ballast pump. On vessels with separate foam line and foam pump fire hoses, main fire pumps can be used as well. It is important that the fire hoses

cover midship sections of the vessel as well as vessel's quarters and stern. Foam is to be used as a final deterrent on deck. Only the extra foam supplied as part of SPM kit is to be used.

Manoeuvring Practice

Ref. BMP5 p. 12 "Manoeuvring Practice" the Master and officers of the watch shall be fully familiar with the impact of zigzag manoeuvres onboard and in particular the impact that these manoeuvres can have upon reducing the speed of the vessel.
If the vessel comes under attack, evasive manoeuvres such as turning the vessel into the wind, provided they do not significantly slow the vessel, should be considered. Forcing the skiffs into the wind and swell has proven effective in hampering attacks.

LRIT Policy

The LRIT shall remain in operation at all times.

SAT-C

The SAT-C must be on "Indian Ocean Region" to ensure the vessel receives urgent piracy alerts and warnings.

Navigation Lights

At night, navigation lights shall be exhibited in accordance with the COLREGS. All deck lights and searchlights shall be utilised when an attack is evident.

Training

A training module entitled "Anti Piracy Awareness" has recently been sent to all vessels. All crewmembers must view this as part of preparation for entering High Risk Area. Drills must be held prior to entering the High Risk Area.

Gas Cylinders

Pressurized cylinders, including any spare medical oxygen cylinders from the hospital, shall be placed in the purpose build locker. Excess gas bottles and flammable materials shall be landed prior transit.
Lockers can be protected with sand bags.

Guidelines for Fitting Razor Wire

This guideline is intended to assist the vessel's crew in fitting razor wire efficiently, safely, and durably. When fitting the razor wire it is important that the crew is wearing helmet, safety goggles, safety shoes, and

heavy duty gloves (e.g. welding gloves) and to obtain wire in short sections so it is easier and safer to move. The use of wire hooks is recommended when placing wire on the vessel.

It is recommended to a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. At least a third ring should be attached to the vessel's railings a steel cable should be rigged through its core. Additionally, razor wire should be secured wire a wire strop to prevent it from being dislodged. Razor wire should also be properly maintained so it does not become rusty and as a result weaker.

It is recommended to fit two layers (see below) with the first layer being Concertina razor wire. Thereby the vessel is still secured even if the first coil is ripped down. It has been reported that pirates in a few incidents have succeeded in ripping down the razor wire by hooks. Therefore, care must be taken when attaching.

The wire must be detached during shipboard operations. Chocks and fairleads should be clear and, if still rigged, razor wire should not interfere with port operations (mooring, gangways, loading and discharging). After dismantling the wire must be washed thoroughly in fresh water and stowed sheltered on hangers or similar.


No gap between first layer and Ship side plate, made it too tight fit to avoid any hooking of portable ladder at side plate.
Second layer made fast in two places
Both layers are connected indipendently to ship's railings
second layer
Main deck
First Layer
950 mm
First layer made fast to railing with seizing wire
Ship side


SECURITY DUMMY


BRIDGE DECK ACCESS BLOCKED, EM ESCAPE ROUTE
ARE NOT OBSTRUCTED


WARNING SIGN IN SOMALI - HIGH VOLTAGE ELECTRIC BARRIER


TWO LAYERES OF BARBED WIRE AROUND THE SHIP
AS PER BMP3

It is important that the silk wire or steel wire run through the centre of the coils of razor wire and that it is positioned behind some of the railing's vertical posts at regular intervals. The combination of the attachment points and the silk or steel wires make it very difficult to tear down the wire even if grappling hooks attached to ropes are being used.

Guidelines for Trailing Lines





Guidelines for Doors

Below are examples of how doors can be strengthened without the need for further keys or the usage of tools. Pipes or wooden struts placed sitting across the rear (interior of the superstructure side) of any external doors can sufficiently deter entrance of pirates or criminal boardings into the core internal sections of a vessel.

Padlocks and locked doors should be used in accordance with MCA and USCG guidance but further strengthening measures should be considered when transiting in high risk areas. NYA data for 2014 shows that when criminals and pirates forced access into secured areas of the vessel, in 50% of incidents blunt force was sufficient enough to break locks. A further 37% of incidents showed padlocks being breeched using tools and cutting equipment gaining access to numerous areas of the vessel including storerooms.





Extra strengthening on at risk doors mainly used in the construction of a secure room or citadel

A further deterrent to access should the lock be broached (metal is preferred to wood)

Watertight door effectively secured

4.3 Information Fusion Centre

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is a 24/7 multi-national maritime security information centre. It aims to achieve early warning of maritime security threats by building a common maritime situation picture through the efforts of the various stakeholders including the shipping community. The IFC is manned by an integrated team of International Liaison Officers and Republic Singaporean Navy personnel and it has extensive linkages with more than 65 agencies in 35 countries. Through its operational linkages, the IFC is able to reach out to different navies and enforcement agencies. The IFC also works with the shipping community to enhance maritime security through regular activities such as the Shared Awareness Meeting (SAM) and company visits.

IFC INITIAL REPORT	
Vessel name:	
International radio call sign:	
Flag:	
Number of crew / nationalities:	
Nationality of ship master:	
IMO number:	
Draft	
MMSI:	
Inmarsat-M telephone number:	
Mobile phone number:	
Inmarsat-C Telex:	
Inmarsat-M / GSM fax number:	
Email address:	

Current position / course:	
Planned passage speed:	
Waypoints of planned track:	
Next port of call and ETA:	
Last port of call:	
Name and address of ship owner:	
Agent name and email address at next port of call:	

Annex A Threat Terminology

The report's findings are predictive and estimative. To communicate these findings clearly and in order to accurately compare threat levels, the report uses a variation of terminology used by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

THREAT LEVEL	DESCRIPTION
Critical	The likelihood of an incident is **certain**
Severe	The likelihood of an incident is **almost certain**
Substantial	The likelihood of an incident is **probable**
Moderate	The likelihood of an incident is **about even**
Low	The likelihood of an incident is **improbable**

Piracy: Crisis24 uses a modified version of the definition of piracy adopted by BMP5. For the purposes of this report, the term 'piracy' includes all violent and non-violent acts against vessels, her crew and cargo occurring either in internal waterways, territorial waters or deep offshore. Based on this definition, Crisis24 classifies piracy incidents into six categories:

- **Hijacking**: Crew lost control of the vessel and / or pirates kidnapped at least one crewmember and / or passenger(s)
- **Boarding**: Pirates successfully board a vessel with the intent to hijack it but their attempt to take control of the vessel or kidnap crewmember(s) and / or passenger(s) failed
- **Attack**: Vessel was attacked with gunfire or RPG fire, no boarding was successfully completed
- **Pirate Action Group (PAG)**: Sighting or reporting of firearms and boarding equipment on board a suspicious vessel or sighting of a confirmed pirate mothership
- **Criminal boarding**: Vessel boarded with criminal intent, theft does not have to occur
- **Suspicious approach**: Suspicious activity reported (i.e. a vessel was approached by unidentified skiff(s) with one or more persons on board)

Limitation

Our opinion and advice are given on the basis of the information given to us in our instructions and the surrounding circumstances known to us to exist at the time when those instructions are given. We do not accept responsibility for verifying the information or investigating beyond its limits. Subsequent changes to relevant information or to the surrounding circumstances may affect the reliability of our opinion and advice but we do not accept responsibility for that effect. We do not accept responsibility for the outcome of action taken or not taken as a result of our opinion and advice unless the possibility of that action being taken or not taken is set out in specific terms in our instructions.